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CHAPTER ONE 
Since 1994 the Denmark based NGO Ghana Venskabsgrupperne i Danmark (The 
Ghana Friendship Groups in Denmark), have been operating several micro-credit programmes in 
severely underdeveloped, rural land districts in northern Ghana. Based on three months field 
research, this thesis is an analysis of one of these projects, operated through the Ghana Friendship 
subsidiaries, the Ghana Development Community Programme (GDCP), and the scheme 
management institution, Simli Pong.1  
Their allocation of one year loans exclusively to impoverished women groups, of 
between 15 and 30 members, are intended to fulfil a number of interrelated objectives;  financial 
self-sustainability, women’s empowerment and poverty reduction. Here it is reasoned that credit 
provision will increase borrowing groups’ level of economic activity and market participation, 
which in turn will improve the community livelihoods through localised economic growth, which 
will also facilitate and improve upon women’s ability to fulfil independent social and economic 
aspirations. A central factor conditioning the implementation of the project however, is the 
overriding economic demand put on the credit programme. Namely, that it has to be completely 
self-sustainable by 2007. This is due to the Danish state aid agency, Danish International 
Development Assistance (DANIDA) removing external funding, that provides for loan-allocation 
administration costs. This has necessitated in the last couple of years that the GDCP/Simli Pong 
programme has undergone a major transition, from being initially an intervention styled aid support 
programme, to being a fully self-financing credit provision institution.  
This analysis concentrates on women’s loan groups who have experienced difficulties 
in repaying their allocated credit, and recognises how their existing community socio-economic 
organisation, has been affected by the implementation of policy designs. This is of interest, because 
it appears that the programme concentration on loans only to women, the requirement that 
operations be self-financing, and the assumption that women’s groups consist of homogenous 
members, are together contradictory to literature, concerning rural African patriarchal governing 
structures, rural spending and saving habits.2  
The above leads up to wanting to understand more, concerning the meeting points of 
embedded socio-economic practices, and the implementation of the micro credit project. In a 
                                                 
1 Loosely translated from Dagbani, Simli Pong means ‘distribution of the common bowl.’ Simli Pong also operates 
financial services such as individual loans for ploughs, a young girls support programme, and a number of courses 
offering vocational skills.  
2 See for example; Lont and Hospes (ed) 2004, Doss 2002, Yaro 2002, Adams et al 1998, Simard 1998, Hyden 1997. 
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broader perspective, it is also hoped that the analysis will contribute to a better understanding of 
complex relationships between developmental agendas, centred on providing economic means, and 
the extent to which, these are able tackle the underlying causes of poverty. In this particular region, 
the most debilitating of which are a reliance on subsistence production, a long history of 
infrastructural neglect compared to the south of the country, and market uncertainties, due to a 
harsh climate and a single yearly harvest.  
Here the paper offers a contribution to comprehending how and why micro-credit 
becomes incorporated into existing community modes of socio-economic organisation, and that 
project design leads to both positive and negative consequences, both intentional and unintentional, 
which are not immediately recognised nor noticeable. Formulating now these issues in terms of a 
research question, the objective is to answer the following;   
Concerning loaning groups who have been provided credit by GDCP/Simli Pong, 
and have experienced repayment difficulties, how are households’ and communities’ existing 
forms of socio-economic organisation, affected by their participation in the credit programme 
and the policy designs forwarding self-sustainability, poverty reduction and women’s 
empowerment?   
 
Having presented the central research question the next chapter will now situate the 
subject matter within a theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
BRIEF HISTORY OF  MICRO-CREDIT  
The provision of small loans to impoverished individuals and communities first arose 
in the mid 1970's with its introduction by the Grameen bank of Bangladesh. Targeting the poor 
through micro credit became heavily influenced by many failed attempts in previous years, in 
especially Latin America, where subsidised credit on broader societal levels, became continually 
manipulated and diverted to richer and larger scale rural producers.3 In more recent years micro-
credit allocation has expanded dramatically, to especially women who are excluded from the formal 
banking sector.4 This peaked perhaps up to and after the first micro credit summit held in 
Washington in 1997, where more then $20 billion was pledged by donors and policy makers to 
support programmes.5 At this summit a general consensus was forwarded that the allocation of 
micro credit was a serious and effective way to reduce poverty levels, and that; 'lending to the poor will 
reduce global poverty' 6 At the Washington summit, confidence in credit projects was reflected by a 
global action plan, supported by a plethora of government, donor and non-governmental agencies 
and international banking interests. Together these planned to provide credit for; '100 million of the 
world's poorest families, and particularly to the women in these families, by 2005,'  which later became the 
United Nations 'International Year of Micro Finance.' 7 In a Danish perspective, the World Summit for Social 
Development, held in Copenhagen in March 1995, underlined again confidence in credit allocation for 
rural producers, landless farmers and women.  
In academic literature however, the growth of micro-credit optimism has been 
shadowed by increasing criticisms directed at the loan-allocation industry, and a heated debate has 
ensued, concerning if, how and under what circumstances micro credit actually leads to increased 
incomes, reduces poverty and/or leads to women's empowerment. Critics often focus attention on 
so-called success indicators, and that the data used to provide good results, can just as easily be 
reversed and give negative conclusions, due to employed statistics being notoriously unreliable.8 
Another central criticism focuses on assumptions contained in policies themselves, such as linking 
increased market participation directly to increased income, and improved household nutrition and 
                                                 
3 Rahman, in Lont and Hospes, p.27. 
4 In a developmental perspective micro credit reflects the so-called neo-liberal paradigm and the ’Washington 
Consensus’ that developed from the late 1980’s. Based on neo-classical economic understandings, this moved away 
from state led agendas and argued that increased market participation would facilitate much needed economic growth. 
See Sandbrook 2000, Gore 2000.   
5 Rahman, in Lont and Hospes, p.27. 
6 ibid.  
7 Smets and Bahre, in Lont and Hospes, p.215. 
8 See for example Mayoux 1999. 
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consumption levels. Again here the opponents state that causal relationships cannot be proven, and 
that results can also be highly inconclusive, marginal or at worst even produce negative effects, and 
finally that credit allocation detracts from much needed structural reform.9  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
Based on these observations, a number of discussion points are now raised, between 
micro-credit policy objectives and borrowing communities existing socio-economic organisation. 
This traces four overlapping arenas that have been identified.  
1. A conceptualisation of relations between micro credit objectives; financial self-sustainability, 
poverty reduction and women's empowerment. 
2. An understanding of receiving communities socio-economic organisation, and how rural African 
groups attempt to lesson hardship resulting from poverty.   
3. A recognition of the main determining factors causing rural vulnerability.    
4. A framework for perceiving and explaining differences and contradictions between explicit 
policy  objectives and practical implementation.   
These conceptual understandings are drawn from empirical studies of micro credit 
schemes from developing countries, which is supplemented with academic literature on West 
Africa, focusing mainly on socio-economic organisation.10    
1.MICRO-CREDIT OBJECTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS; SELF SUSTAINABILITY, 
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION  
On the basis of research from a large number of micro credit projects in developing 
countries, Linda Mayoux pinpoints central policy objectives found in all. These are programme self 
sustainability, women’s empowerment and poverty reduction, whereby self-sustainability is often 
the most overriding policy condition, and that the pursuit of this objective is often fulfilled only to 
the detriment of the other two.11 Additionally, the methods by which credit is allocated, writes 
                                                 
9 See for example Botchway 2000, Chavan 2002, Cleaver 1999, Hanak 2000, Longwe 1997, Lont and Hospes (ed) 
2004. 
10 It was not possible to obtain any independent academic literature whatsoever concerning any socio-economic effects 
of micro credit allocation in either northern Ghana or for that matter Ghana as a whole, despite the quite considerable 
number and scope of micro credit allocation projects in the country. Most internet sources focus predominantly on 
programme descriptions. See for example Ghana Micro-Finance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN, gdrc.org.). With the 
exception of one consultancy report (Kuunyem 2004) all the secondary literature obtained on the micro-credit project 
analysed in this paper was written by the allocating parties themselves (GDCP, SP, GV and Danida) in the form of 
baseline studies, annual and semi-annual reports. As detailed in chapter five, these focus overwhelmingly on the 
administrative, technical  and/or  financial recovery side of credit.  
11 Mayoux’s research was based on programmes implemented by Community Development Centre (CODEC) in 
Bangladesh, Professional Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN) in India, Zambuko Trust and Self-Help 
Development Fund (SHDF) in Zimbabwe, Small Enterprise Foundation (SEF) in South Africa, CARE-PULSE and 
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Mayoux, necessitates the construction and reproduction of a number of interrelated assumptions, 
which support the overriding concern, termed the ’financial self-sustainability paradigm.’ Implementation 
procedures underlying the self sustainability paradigm rest on a logical framework which, assumes 
further, a number of explicit and positive relationships between the project design and the desired 
results. Mayoux writes that programmes often fail, measured against their own objectives, because 
self sustainability demands the denial of a large number of actual conditions, social, economic, 
political and historical, that condition growth and which the policy assumptions neglect. For 
example, the projects Mayoux focused upon all generally assumed that women took the decision of 
how loans were to be used, that loans would increase income and access to resources, and that 
credit allocation would automatically strengthen women's ’social capital.’ Additionally, projects 
assumed that group actions were more effective than individual’s economic endeavours, and that 
both groups and individuals, having common interests, were in a position to take advantage of 
market fluctuations, in order to accrue maximum benefit. In sum, the central criticism raised by 
Mayoux is that projects presume that; ’these mutually reinforcing spirals of empowerment can occur following 
women’s access to micro-finance without explicit support for women to increase their incomes, to defend their interests 
within the household or for wider social and political changes in gender or class relations.’ 12  
Considering now how lending to women through groups can affect the desired 
outcome, Karl Botchway, in an analysis of a fresh water provision project in northern Ghana, here 
argues that the notion of promoting a ’community’ in order to forward project objectives is far from 
unproblematic.13 This is because the construction of a group, as an self empowering community, 
builds on a notion of group homogeneity which overlooks the conditions under which the 
’community’ has to participate, in order to ensure programme sustainability. Bothchway realises 
that group construction was assumed to have a positive relation to empowerment, but in practice it 
was very often the case, that individuals had considerably different interests and capabilities. This 
not only affected individual’s ability to participate in the ‘community,’ but influenced as well how 
their position in the group, after project participation, continued to condition the extent to which the 
programme objectives could be fulfilled or not. Here an individual’s specific characteristics affected 
the plight of the community or group as a whole, although the programme constructed an entity of 
homogenous individuals, with equal means, interests and goals. Botchway acknowledges here that 
the forwarding of this supposed homogenous community, required the neglect of socio-economic 
                                                                                                                                                                  
CARE-PROSPECT in Zambia and Cameroon Gatsby Trust (CGT) and its partner organisations Mbonweh and CIPCRE 
in Cameroon. Mayoux 2000, in Journal for Entwicklungspolitik XVI/3, p. 247. 
12 Mayoux 2000, in Journal for Entwicklungspolitik XVI/3,  p.253. 
13 Botchway 2001.  
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disparities and different levels of access to resources, as in actual fact the group consisted in 
simplified terms of the poor, the very poor and the not so poor.  
The emphasis on group participation, dictated on terms outside the (participatory) 
control of the community itself, leads Botchway to points out that participation often becomes 
’disembedded’ from its socio-cultural roots. Here he writes that participation; ’is thus reduced to the act 
of partaking in the objectives of the economy, and the societal arrangements related to it, while communities are 
not allowed to question the conditions under which they develop.14  
2. RURAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANISATION   
The above brings us to the need of understanding conceptually how rural social and 
economic organisation functions in practice. This is significant as it raises the question of whether 
borrowing communities are organised on a basis different, or even opposed to the explicit policy 
objectives of increasing economic activities through loan groups. This is done by drawing on 
elements of Goran Hyden.15 Hyden’s central point based on empirical studies in Tanzania is that 
class concepts are; 'not particularly helpful when looking at (...) societies in which pre-capitalist social formations 
persisted.'16 Hyden highlights instead social formations centred on an 'economy of affection,' whose 
preservation and reproduction is conditioned by the nation-states inability or unwillingness to either 
tax rural populations effectively, or mobilise the peasantry for developmental change. The most 
significant characteristic of an ‘economy of affection’ used to; 'denote(s) a network of support, 
communications and interactions among structurally defined groups connected by blood, kin, community or other 
affinities, for example religion.' is that social organisation mitigates forcefully against;  'the accumulation of 
wealth or capital necessary for the formation of either industrial modes of production or class-based societies.'
17  
Hyden’s economy of affection is invested through important social ceremonies 
connected to the cycles of life; births, marriages and funerals, which provide important 
opportunities for individuals to make public, the most significant events and their families private 
occasions.18 These social occasions provide the basis for communities to invest in each other 
socially for future mutual support. 
3. COMMUNITY VULNERABILITY FACTORS  
A recognition of how credit allocation interacts with existing social and economic 
organisation also necessitates a differentiation between micro and macro institutional and structural 
                                                 
14 Majid Rahnema, quoted in Botchway, p.148.  
15 Hyden 1997, Waters, 1992.  
16 Hyden, 1997 p.19, based on Hyden's  1980; Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Under-development and an Uncaptured 
Peasantry. 
17 Hyden 1980 here quoted in Waters p.163-164.  
18 Hyden, 1997, p. 29. 
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forces, which condition an individual’s ability or willingness, to partake in envisaged participatory 
and empowering actions. This is done by drawing on Adams, Cekan and Suerborn (1998), who 
distinguish between endogenous and exogenous factors. They argue that a vast number of 
developmental projects in West Africa, offer only a palliative to community developmental issues 
because they overlook, neglect or deny the extent to which broader forces determine the nature of 
coping strategies, and indeed poverty.19  
The endogenous factors are those affecting immediate household actions, such as 
individuals disparate levels of access to resources, while the exogenous factors reflect structural 
forces, such as the region’s macro political-economy, the climate and its influence over production. 
In sum it is the extent to which borrowers are able and/or willing to (re)negotiate within household, 
community and macro level institutions that will dictate both how monies are utilised, and 
importantly condition whether project objectives are fulfilled. The focus reflects what in 
developmental literature is broadly described as a livelihoods approach.’20 Basically, individuals 
are understood by Adams et al to have more control, the closer one moves to the domestic domain, 
while the exogenous factors remain largely outside the control of individuals and groups. Similar to 
Mayoux, Adams criticises policies that focus on target groups, due to the assumption that 
responsibilities are shared, which is often not the case. Households’ coping strategies become a 
trade off between different and often conflicting priorities, which is a function of the exogenous and 
endogenous factors they are exposed to. Although Adams is more focused on the risk strategies of 
vulnerable households in times of crisis, the framework is also applicable in order to understand 
how credit allocation, as a means envisaged to improve on household livelihood standards, becomes 
absorbed into existing institutional norms.   
4. DISPARITIES BETWEEN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION  
In order to comprehend what exactly can possibly cause disparities between policy 
designs and actual practical implementation, the final part of the theoretical framework builds on 
observations made by Aminur Rahman, from a Grameen bank financed micro-credit project in 
Bangladesh. He argues for a differentiation between ’public and hidden transcripts’ in order to ’provide a 
more comprehensive picture of the credit allocation process.’21 Similar to Mayoux, this separation enables a 
recognition of how policy, bounded by superior overriding concerns, may require that other explicit 
                                                 
19 Adams et al 1998. 
20 This is defined as the; ’activities of people with regard to the management of means and opportunities that are 
basically directed towards the protection or improvement of material living conditions.’ Lont and Hospes, p.6. 
21 Rahman, p. 68. 
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policy objectives be either ignored, denied or placed in the background. Rahmen writes that this 
stems from projects often being over ambitious, which leads to parallel institutional norms having 
to be practised.  
Rahman’s public or overt discourse highlights assumed positive correlations, 
purported between group loans, an increase in members ability to make empowering and  
independent decisions, and finally income increases. This construction however, writes Rahman, 
not only demands a neglect of intra-household disparities, as pointed out by Mayoux and Adams, 
but additionally that the project itself is influenced by existing cultural institutions. In Rahmen’s 
study this led to project staff having to balance between competing and often opposing interests; to 
further the ideals of the developmental project itself, or reproduce existing cultural norms, which 
they had a stake in. Rahman writes here that project staff understandings and their own sociological 
dispositions were in fact detrimental to the fulfilment of the overall programme objectives 
themselves.22  
The two arenas of open/public and closed/hidden discourses enable disparities 
between policy intentions and practice to be recognised. The public transcript in Rahman’s study 
also consisted of the explicit policy objective, that targeting women will automatically raise the 
household level as a whole, because women bear the brunt of household responsibilities. This  
forwarded an understanding that community co-operation and group unity would enhance women's 
solidarity. The hidden transcript meanwhile concentrated on how men were  explicitly excluded 
from the programme, due mainly to the demands of financial self-sustainability, rather then any 
serious wish to empower women. Rahman here draws attention to how the Grameen Bank 
constructed a public discourse of an gendered economic division, in order to lesson transaction 
costs. He also shows how staff accepted spouses use of monies, while it was women's limited 
mobility, and their (constructed) culturally patterned behaviour as reliable and responsible, that 
made them most suitable for loans. This also satisfied a contemporary paradigm of supporting 
women in the community and grassroots development. To conclude here, the central claim made by 
Rahmen, is that the lending structure itself can contain contradictory elements, that can be self 
defeating, though dependent on each other for mutual legitimacy.  
                                                 
22 Longwe makes a similar argument concerning how gender empowerment endeavours often become subordinated to 
patriarchal interests in development projects. Longwe 1997.   
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SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTS OF ENQUIRY FOR 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The above has presented four interrelated themes which conceptualise micro-credit 
objectives, institutional procedures related to these, and the socio-economic organisation of rural 
African communities. Firstly Mayoux argues that pursuing self-sustainability is often predominant 
in micro credit projects, which leads to a neglect of empowerment and poverty reduction ambitions. 
Botchway similarly opinions that group construction, in order to obtain sustainability, can detract 
from empowerment aspirations, and result in loss of effectiveness, due to individuals different 
possibilities and dispositions within constructed groups. Finally Rahman writes that group 
construction, while possibly negating decision making abilities, also aids hidden discourses. All 
three would agree that group targeting and construction is based more on the requirement of 
keeping transaction costs to a minimum, rather than the active pursuit of empowerment or poverty 
reduction. In a broader perspective Mayoux, Botchway and Rahman would also agree with Adams 
et al, in that micro credit projects do not consider the causes of initial hardship sufficiently.  
Hyden meanwhile contends that rural organisation is culturally geared against 
capitalisation, while indirectly, in the context of credit allocation, he draws attention to how 
project’s own normative  understandings of empowerment, may detract from communities own 
conceptions of increased influence. This draws attention to having to recognise the form socio-
economic organisation takes and why this is adopted instead of others.  
In total these understandings allow access to recognising how project design and 
implementation interacts with borrowing individuals and communities. Drawing on Mayoux, 
Botchway and Adams et al, and taking first the project side, it is necessary to address project 
design, any related relevant assumptions and implementation procedures, including project staff 
understandings. After this the central endogenous and exogenous factors need to be recognised, 
which can be named as follows. The endogenous factors covered are (women) borrowers access to 
resources, relations between husbands and wives, the number of household dependants borrowers 
have to support, the age and health of borrowers and their social position in the family and the 
broader community. The central exogenous factors meanwhile include the environmental conditions 
and how this relates to modes of production, control over resources, the socio-economic levels of 
the region itself, the role social networks play in relation to the economy, transport and 
infrastructure levels, and finally the history of underdevelopment the region has witnessed. For 
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easier understanding the theoretical framework and the object of analysis can be conceptualised in 
the form of the model below.  
 
THEORY MODEL: 
 
EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
Trends, Seasonality, Culture 
                                                                      
  
CREDIT PROJECT      COMMUNITIES 
 institutions,       shocks, household traits 
policy objectives       endogenous factors 
 + assumptions      social capital; economy of affection 
public and hidden discourses    
 
livelihood outcomes  
         & strategies 
OBJECT OF ENQUIRY 
 
On the basis of this theoretical discussion the following working hypothesis can now 
be formulated.  
1. Project self-sustainability necessitates the construction of community socio-economic 
characteristics which detract considerably from actual organisation. 
2. Self sustainability requires a number of supportive assumptions that undermine communities 
existing modes of economic and social organisation. 
3. Project implementation reproduces structural characteristics that ultimately are the cause of 
household and community level insecurity and poverty.   
  
Having presented the theoretical points of reference the next chapter now offers the 
methodological approach to the research question.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
This chapter addresses the methods employed, which aimed to recognise the working 
practices and administrative procedures of the credit programme, and borrowers socio-economic 
organisation, together with their experiences of loan allocation. As reflected in the above model, the 
programme design was separated from the borrowing communities. This allowed the two arenas to 
be understood as separate entities which subsequently enabled interactions between the two to be 
conceptualised in temporal sequences.23  
SOURCES: UNDERSTANDING PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTION 
Taking first the project side of the model, the aim was to identify specific policy 
objectives and recognise how the fulfilment of these was related to implementation in practice. This 
involved collection and reading of GDCP/Simli Pong policy literature, which consisted mainly of 
internal, semi annual and annual reports, baseline and consultant papers.24 This also provided a 
general overview of the programme size, the number of borrowers and groups and their repayment 
records. Additionally the purpose of this was to make known explicit programme plans, any 
associated assumptions, and to identify relationships between policy design and how communities 
were approached and constructed. On the basis of this, the project side of the equation was divided 
into four time periods; the application period, the disbursement stage, the period of repayment and 
finally the period after repayments were due.  
By concentrating on these different periods, the influence of fixed policy procedures, 
and particularly the demands of regular repayment, could be addressed, and compared with existing 
community economic and social practices. Of particular concern here was to reveal if any policy 
objectives were given priority over others, to recognise the basis for this, and see how other aspects 
of implementation were affected by any other policy aims. Material concerning project success was 
also collected, to uncover relations between the utilised indicators, implementation designs and 
again the policy objectives. A number of interviews with staff supplemented understandings gained 
from printed material. Together with staff interviews, a number of visits with Simli Pong staff to 
groups additionally allowed practical recognition of how group animation, applications, 
disbursements and finally collections were implemented. This stage consequently gave an 
                                                 
23 This is also inspired by focusing more on community livelihoods, influenced by credit allocation, rather then actual 
income levels. Amartya Sen, inter alia, from the early 1980’s, realised that assessing income levels was notoriously 
difficult in developing economies, due to recirculation of money between communities, investment in kind and 
seasonally influenced economic value of property. Instead Sen focused on community and individual capabilities and 
entitlements, defined as access to resources and thereby rural groups ability to acquire power. It was from this that the 
livelihood approach developed. Gifford, in Lont and Hospes, p.70.   
24 A full list of the utilised texts is given in the bibliography. 
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understanding of the level and type of interaction between Simli Pong and borrowing groups and 
individuals. These also aimed to unveil how staff comprehended and prioritised the project 
objectives, and if and how their dispositions affected relations with the loaning communities. This 
aimed to identify as well how any conflictual situations were handled, in such cases as repayment 
being delayed for example, and how solutions to problems were envisaged.    
-COMMUNITY, GROUP, INDIVIDUAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORGANISATION  
Contact with the borrowing communities concentrated on uncovering how the 
fulfilment of programme demands interacted with their existing modes of savings, borrowing, 
spending and investment. This involved gaining an understanding of how economic organisation 
and investments in social relations were affected especially by the physical environment, and how 
credit allocation influenced these practices. This was done by categorising borrowers’ practices into 
three rough time periods constituting pre-harvest, harvest and post harvest intervals. Here the aim 
was also to uncover how policy designs, which aimed to time loans with harvests, affected 
community procedures based on improving food security and income for the year. In other words, 
how credit allocation around harvest times affected and influenced existing practices based on 
seasonal vagaries.   
This part of the empirical material collection involved independent visits to a number 
of groups, where in-depth interviews were carried out through an interpreter, with both individuals 
and small groups of borrowers. Interviews mostly  took the form of semi structured and open ended 
conversations, though when the occasion arose, spouses were also interviewed and at times groups 
of three or four borrowers invited to discuss issues together. Interviews were carried out on 
individuals awaiting disbursement after loan application, some whom were in the process of 
repayment (after harvests), and finally those whose repayment were due, post harvest. In total 22 
individual interviews were carried out, 5 of which were with borrowers and spouses together, and 3 
with up to 5 borrowers present at a time. These informants together covered in total 6 different 
borrowing groups. Focus was placed on how, if and why their economic habits were embedded in 
social affiliations, how this was affected by the formation of lending groups, and especially, how 
choices were made between saving in cash and kind, and why.   
Together with recognising the broader elements of household's economic 
organisation, it was necessary to uncover both the immediate and underlying  reasons behind 
individuals’ demand for credit. This was done through questions concerning recent calamities, that 
had demanded perhaps the selling of stock, such as illness, death or a poor harvest etc. Similarly, 
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positive correlations between loan disbursement, and increases in grain stock and increased 
consumption were also pursued. Overall questioning enabled comparisons between policy practice 
and the realities on the ground. This followed individuals and groups through from December to 
March, where they were visited up to three times. The development of interviews over this time 
period aimed to uncover how individuals and group practices were affected by intra-group relations 
and influences stemming from harvest and subsequent market changes. Finally these recognitions 
were placed in the context of the observations made from the project side. This enabled an 
understanding of if and why repayment demands complemented borrowers optimal selling 
opportunities, how borrowers own understandings of empowerment fitted those of the project, and 
finally how project demands affected existing socio-economic organisation.   
In total interviews with borrowers aimed to uncover; 
1.  Endogenous and exogenous factors that influenced household demand and use of credit.  
2.  Any conflictual areas between project designs and embedded community practices.    
3. The extent to which credit allocation could offset the causes of household vulnerabilities.   
4. Borrowers experiences and aspirations concerning their utilisation of credit compared to project 
objectives.  
Following the two arenas allowed an overall recognition of how the policy objectives 
were implemented and how this affected receiving individuals and groups both before, during and 
after harvest. The method then enabled interactions between two spheres to be recognised as 
separate and overlapping; the realm of receiving individuals at different stages in the season, and 
that of institutionalised procedures for loan application, disbursement and collection.  
INFORMANT SELECTION  
All borrowing community informants had been involved with the loan programme for 
between one and three years, and the choice for interviews was undertaken in a semi-selective 
manner.25 The visits with Simli Pong staff to groups during the initial stage of field work, enabled 
communities to be more easily located independently, at the later stage with the interpreter. Most of 
the individuals interviewed (18 out of a total of 22), were members of groups which by Simli Pong 
were seen as generally problematic, due to their overall poor repayment records, and it was mainly 
this that raised interest in finding out more about their experiences with credit. After visits with 
staff, the payment records of these groups was traced through office records, in order to identify 
closer the extent of their economic default, and categorise these as a separate sub-group (this is 
                                                 
25 The majority of borrowing groups do not exist in the same form for more than 4-5 years. This is discussed in more 
detail in chapters 6-8. 
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presented in the next chapter). The reason for this choice of informant was based on the fact that 
here group disparities became immediately apparent, which enabled the concept of group borrowing 
to be problematisised.  
Common to all informants was that they lived within an hours motorbike ride from the 
GDCP centre in Dalun, where I stayed, enabling frequent and easier visits. The geographical spread 
of the 6 groups is illustrated in sketch form in appendix 3.   
INTERVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
The following will now outline some central limitations relevant to the research which 
were experienced during the field trip. The most significant problem was having to rely on 
informants as being trustworthy and honest in their answering, and to more or less take what they 
said as being reasonably accurate. Regarding especially repayment problems, group relations and 
intra-household issues, answers were difficult, if not impossible to verify. Tensions within groups 
over some individual’s inability to fulfil repayment demands, were however sometimes obvious to 
spot from group meetings because there was open hostility. Similarly, when individuals purported 
to have experienced material gains from the loan, I also frequently asked to see the evidence of 
accumulation, on the pretence that I wanted to see what they had bought or how grain was stored, 
which to some extent allowed claims to be checked. Visiting groups over a three month period also 
allowed informant answers to be verified in other ways. Starting in early December, there was 
immense pressure on loan staff at this time to collect as much money as possible before the end of 
year financial accounts, which provided good opportunities to observe how collection demands 
compared with borrowers access to cash at this particular time, when also the rice harvest was at its 
peak. Allowing for this however, the three month time scale was not enough to adequately follow 
borrowers from the start of the season to finish, and more time would also have enabled households 
to be followed more intensely through the whole of the dry season.   
On a day to day basis, the biggest problem with interviewing borrowers was to strike 
the right balance between an eagerness to gain confidence without being too pushy, and trying 
continually to verify and/or reformulate questions, without reducing the interview to some kind of 
cross examination.26 This was partly overcome by repeated visits and interviews with other group 
members, which gave a more fuller understanding. To gain confidence I initially stressed to all 
borrowers that I was not employed by either GDCP nor Simli Pong, that I had absolutely no 
                                                 
26 If a group member for example replied that her husband had squandered a large portion of the loaned money, I was 
thus not always in the position to question the informant further, nor dig into if she herself had spent the money, or for 
that matter ask the spouse himself why or how the monies were spent. 
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influence over the allocation and collection of monies, that I had no intention of identifying them in 
person, and finally that I was only interested in how the loan affected people in general. In sum, that 
I was more concerned with the meeting of different practices, rather than studying their individual 
and personal case histories. By endeavouring to always find a quiet place to talk without 
interference, the positive repose was often revealed indirectly in a deafening silence, whenever 
especially an elder male family member suddenly appeared around a corner. Overall informants 
expressed a very real interest in being interviewed, and there was a good deal of willingness and 
thankfulness, that someone had taken the time to find out a little more concerning the vulnerabilities 
of their every day lives. This indicated in the least, that there was a wealth of untapped knowledge 
in rural districts that had not been utilised to the full.   
That the utilised interpreter was a well known and likeable figure in and around the 
village of Dalun, proved quickly to be more of an asset, than being a possible source of a conflict of 
interest or a hindrance, as I initially feared. Accessing communities where everybody seemed to 
know everybody else, if not on a personal level, than certainly through common friends, required 
introduction from a respected individual. This I’m sure made questioning on otherwise problematic 
issues more acceptable. It should however be made clear that it was exclusively my decision whom 
we should talk to and under no instances did GDCP/Simli Pong, nor the interpreter, try to influence 
whom I should interview or where I should go. Having said that, at the end of the day I was 100% 
reliant on the interpreter translating correctly what I asked, and what the informants had answered, 
which linguistically could not be verified. Concerning the group meetings I witnessed between 
groups and loan collection officers, the most relevant issue was the extent to which my presence 
influenced informants actions. One loan officer conceived that my being at a collection meeting 
most certainly had influenced the subsequent (unexpected) high repayment rate at that particular 
visit, as members in arrears (probably) thought that I was there to back him up in enforcing 
sanctions. Although situations like these were difficult to avoid, I found overall that borrowers paid 
little interest in my being at these meetings.  
It quickly became obvious that hardly any of the borrowers had any inkling of their 
own age, and almost all had no idea of how old their children were. This deficit stemmed from 
borrowers mainly non-existent level of schooling, and them living in a very informal and paperless 
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society, but also in the fact that the Dagbani people generally do not celebrate their birthdays. This 
led to it being necessary to make an adhoc estimation of borrowers age, which I put at 55.27 
Due to immediately noticeable redistribution and circulation of resources between 
families and communities, it was not possible to assess borrowers income level and/or any increases 
or decreases accruing from the loan. As is discussed later, subsistence households’ income levels 
and the positive or negative investments they happen to have made in cash or kind, can vary 
considerably throughout the year. This makes any estimation of income very temporally contingent 
and ultimately unreliable. This was complicated by the recognition of the widespread practice of  
small 'loans,' which also covered ‘gift’ giving and/or ‘contributions’ between families and friends, 
which immediately gave Hyden’s observations some support. Future investments thus often take the 
form of a small or even a considerably large 'contribution,'  being made at a prosperous time to near 
relatives or friends social ceremonies, which in times of hardship are capitalised upon and 
‘returned’. Like ‘savings’ in livestock, this form of capital can stem from ‘borrowed’ money, but 
proves elusive to definitions in terms of a negative or positive balance.28 This is because the 
investment may not strictly be individual nor communal, and depends again on the social and 
temporal context in which it is ‘cashed.’29 This meant that questions regarding income levels had to 
be adjusted, and centred around finding out borrowers main source of income at this particular 
time.  In total, that less attention was given to determining the different units and sources of their 
income, and more weight was given to assessing the overall affects loan design had on their ability 
to repay.  
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
Having outlined the methods employed to analyse  the effects of loan procedures on 
borrowers socio-economic organisation, and having presented a number of significant 
considerations, the following will now outline the disposition for the rest of the paper. Chapter four 
                                                 
27 I estimated by judging on their appearance, and size and number of children and/or grandchildren and through 
discussion with the translator. From this it was estimated that of  the 22 informants, one was under 30, four were 
between 30-40, thirteen were between 40-50, two were between 50-60 and two were over 60. The GDCP 2005 baseline 
report recorded that only 13% of borrowers were below 30 years of age while 57% were between 31-50 and 31% were 
over 51. The process of ageing is celebrated much more in terms of 'stages of life' such as the giving of a name to a 
child, entering or leaving school, marriage, the birth of a couples first child, and the birth of a grandchild. When 
describing people in terms of how old they are, Dagbanis will invariably answer that the described person is as old as 
so-and-so, that he or she is older or younger then the questioner, or for example that the person has just got married etc. 
Inability to estimate age however should not be confused with numerously. All informants has solid skills of mental 
arithmetic, of estimating % rises and falls in seasonal prices and in working out returns or loses on loans. 
28 See for example Lont and Hospes. 
29 Amongst some of the best descriptions of rural socio-economic organisation and how community economics are 
embedded in broader social systems are Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation and Pierre Bourdieu’s Outline of a 
Theory of Practice. See bibliography. 
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now presents a detailed presentation of the GDCP/Simli Pong micro-credit programme, its history, 
objectives, indicators for success and central characteristics, concerning the number of clients 
involved, organisational structure, programme size and identification of target groups. This also 
analyses how credit demand is sanctioned through applications procedures and assumptions 
connected to this. After this chapter five gives details concerning the location itself, giving a 
description of loan participants’ economic activities, the main exogenous and recognised 
endogenous factors both on the regional, local and household level. This also characterises the 
regions production base and resource control. Chapter six then focuses on the borrowing individuals 
demand for credit, and relations between the application process, group construction and 
endogenous factors. Chapter seven concentrates on the period after repayment, and relations 
between existing socio-economic organisation and disciplinary action connected to default. Finally  
chapter eight sums up the observations made, in relation to the research question, and the employed 
theoretical framework.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The primary aim of this chapter is to recognise the designs of the GDCP/Simli Pong 
credit programme, by applying Mayoux and Rahman, and positioning policy in the context of the 
three development paradigms of self-sustainability, women’s empowerment and poverty alleviation 
After this, the indicators utilised for programme success are discussed, which then allows finally a 
categorisation of the problematic groups, as a separate sub-group, to be realised.   
CENTRAL PROGRAMME FEATURES 
GDCP has been operating in the northern region for some 25 years, and currently has 
activities in four main sectors.30 Simli Pong operates the loan scheme solely in the northern region 
districts of Tolon/Kumbungu and Savelugu/Nanton where the 6 groups resided. The scheme was 
formed in January 2005 from the GDCP loan project 'Women and Loans’ which had been 
disbursing credit since 1996.31 
The most defining characteristics of the credit programme is loaning only to women's 
groups of between 15-30 individuals.32 These are predominantly used for women’s traditional 
activities such as shea butter processing, ground nut processing, rice production and petty trading, 
based on the rationale that borrowers already have solid experience with these tasks. Communities 
send in applications for a group loan and monies are disbursed after approval by Simli Pong 
management. A successful application has to include all members names, a description of the 
groups objectives, and any qualifications gained by members. Would-be members pay in small 
amounts weekly or monthly to a group account, perhaps over 3-4 months, in order to build up 
collateral and prove their worth to Simli Pong. This also acts as a self-selection process in the 
community, as not all would-be members can fulfil this demand. The group also has to appoint a 
leader, (the Magazia) a cashier and a secretary, who form the groups’ executive. Immediately above 
the group is a loan facilitator, who acts as mediator between a small number of groups, the 
                                                 
30 Simli Pong stands for micro credit, Simli Radio operates a community based radio from Dalun, Dagbon Ninneesim 
Karimzong (DNK) which offers short courses in vocational skills to women and youths, in for example dress making, 
masonry, carpentry and hairdressing, and finally Tinkpansi Lebgimsim (TL) works with the formation and training of 
Local Communities, in order to facilitate infrastructure projects such as school blocks, clinics and nurses quarters.  
31 GDCP: Strengthening Civil Society, (S.C.S. p.14-16). Success statistics also depend on the time of year 
measurements are taken, which is addressed later in this chapter. The women's and loans scheme from 1998 to 2003 
disbursed about 7000 loans to women and a 2002 mid term review evaluated the project as 'well functioning,' with loan 
recovery rates put at an 'excellent 98%.' Overall, this assessment emphasised that; 'the micro credit scheme was found to 
have an enormous impact.' Ibid. 
32 Due to increased financial constraints, from 2005 onwards men were excluded entirely from credit allocation which 
was decided after countless difficulties experienced securing repayments from male borrowers. Source: Interviews with 
senior staff.  
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respective loan officer and management. The loan officer’s main tasks involve monthly visits to 
groups to collect repayments and to act as the first link in the process of new group formation, 
termed animation. On approval, a typical loan is 600,000 cedis to each group member, excluding an 
annual 30% interest rate, bring the total amount owed to 780,000 cedis (approx.£50).33 The first 
three months is a repayment free grace period, after which the remaining 9 months demand regular 
monthly payments of 87,000 cedis (ca.£6). Besides this repayment, members are also encouraged to 
save between 2-10 thousand cedis a month (between ca. £0.15 - £0.60.) to a saving account 
monitored by Simli Pong.34 As repayment commences groups are monitored monthly and loan 
renewal is conditioned by all members keeping up individual and regular instalments and finishing 
at the agreed time.35 Loan disbursal is designed to coincide with the respective harvest of shea nuts, 
rice and ground nuts, so that vulnerabilities stemming from year round subsistence farming, 
seasonal swings in commodity production and price fluctuations are eased.   
POLICY TENETS AND ASSUMPTIONS:  
-FINANCIAL SELF-SUSTAINABILITY 
In a consultancy report from June 2004, the overall objective of programme financial 
self-sustainability was emphasised with the aim of achieving; '...100% sustainability within 2 years, to 
expand lending portfolio by 70% in the 1st operational year and 10% in subsequent years.' 36 This financial 
expansion plan was necessary due to high operational costs, where staff posts in 2004 took 34% of 
total revenue and transport an additional 23%.37 An increased loan portfolio was subsequently put 
forward to offset costs in order to;  'yield the greatest return that would contribute to institutional 
sustainability.
38 Based additionally on the overriding concern, that Danida aid to the project was to be 
withdrawn from 2007, the demand for economic rigour is clear from the operational figures given 
for 2003, where total income constituted just over one half expenditure. Put another way, the 
programme costs in 2003 had excelled revenue by a ratio of more than 2:1. Because the only source 
of income was in the near future to be only from the interest on loans, programme self-sustainability 
required significant increases in revenue, that could only come from expanding and reaching out to 
                                                 
33 The stated interest rate is in fact much higher in practice, as it is calculated on the basis of the disbursed amount and 
doesn't take into account the reduced debt following the monthly repayments. At the time of writing actual inflation was 
15% and bank interest rates between 18-21%.  
34 This was more of a symbolic amount aimed at teaching communities how to save cash regularly, which also provided 
part coverage in times of default. One months savings would just about cover the price of one litre of petrol (8000 cedis 
in January 2006), or a return trip to Tamale. A years savings could possibly cover the cost of access to water from a 
stand pipe for one month, or the price of the cheapest one way bus ticket to the capital Accra. (ca. 80000 cedis).  
35 10% of the total loan goes direct into a so-called treasurers bill account. When the loan is fully paid off the group can 
then cash in the bill as a form of reward. 
36 Kuunyem, p.4. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
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more communities. The realities of the expansion plan are immediately noticeable, when it is 
recognised that at the end of 2004 Simli Pong had 124 credit groups established, with another 44 
being in the process of application, while at the end of December 2005, the total number of 
operating groups (those which had received loans) had risen to 180, with an additional 20 odd 
awaiting application and disbursement. Giving a total membership of just over 4000 women, by 
years end 2005 the programme had subsequently expanded by 68%. In sum it is clear from the 
above that financial self-sustainability is the overall objective of the GDCP/Simli Pong credit 
programme and that this demand has to be covered by significant portfolio expansion.39  
-WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The GDCP policy plan to implement self-sustainability also forwards women’s 
empowerment as a central policy objective. The policy document titled Phase 6, ‘Strengthening 
Civil Society’ (SCS) here connects loan allocations to; ‘increase the ability of women to participate actively 
in decision-making processes and community development,' and to improve livelihoods so that;  'women are 
empowered to improve upon their income-generating activities.' The target groups are defined as specifically 
women because; 'they bear the main responsibility for the day-to-day keep of the household and the family.' 40  
Evaluating passed experience, the phase 6 document also points out a positive 
relationship between the pursuit of financial self-sustainability, and the simultaneous goals of 
poverty reduction and women’s empowerment, emphasising that this has been achieved with 
receiving communities enjoying; 'a considerable increase in income' and that; 'the empowerment of these 
women has been very important,' again that; 'many (women) now feel more independent,' and finally, that the loans 
have provided; 'group solidarity and a higher social status.'41 The need of fulfilling these objectives whilst 
also reaching the economic targets, by expanding loan reach, is highlighted by maintaining; 'for Simli 
Pong to have the highest possible impact on civil society; a strategy will be not only to make the loan scheme recover 
costs, but also to give as many women as possible the chance of obtaining a loan and thereby improving upon their and 
their families' living standards through income-generating activities.' 42 The target group is defined here as in 
the previous consultancy report by Kuunyem, in broad terms as those women denied access to 
formal banking.43 From the above, there is clearly a positive correlation and overt discourses 
relating the targeting of women, income generation, empowerment, high repayment rates, and 
portfolio expansion. 
                                                 
39 Sources: Internal copies of loan statistics and group numbers and interviews with senior staff. 
40 GDCP; SCS, p.21 
41 GDCP; SCS, p. 16. There is no mention in this document of groups experiencing repayment problems or any other 
difficulties concerning individuals taking loans. 
42 GDCP SCS, p.36. 
43 Kuunyem, p.6. 
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The execution of these three policy aims can be thus be understood as resting on a 
logical framework, which assumes cumulative positive relations between each separate objective. 
Firstly, as stated in the phase 6 document, the 'mobilisation of women and women encouraged to form loan 
groups' will lead with training and encouragement of savings mobilisation to an outcome 
characterised by an; 'increased ability of women to participate actively in decision making processes and 
community development.' Further, by 'inform(ing) women of the possibilities of co-operation (and) micro credit to 
women's groups,' group participation will result in; 'women (being) empowered to improve upon their income 
generating activities.' And lastly, it is assumed that; 'micro credits to start up income generating activities' will 
result in an; ' increased number of young people making use of vocational skills.'44  
The construction of loaning groups is also understood as facilitating an increase in 
members empowering ‘decision making,’ (itself unquantifieable), which presumes that the women 
members have common objectives, that their loans will not be diverted to other ventures, and finally 
that accompanied economic activities will lead to earnings growth. Lastly the construction is 
founded on an implicit understanding that the generation of surplus income alone will provide 
monies for loan repayment. 
ASSUMPTIONS IN PRACTICE: GENDERED (IR) RESPONSIBILITY 
The connection between targeting only women and self-sustainability, as a hidden 
discourse, was revealed in numerous conversations with project staff, who, despite being 
predominantly male themselves, continually reinforced and reproduced the construction of other 
men as definitively irresponsible. Conversely, as is demonstrated above, women are explicitly 
characterised as being economically responsible and further, that females are able to benefit from 
credit and that their aspirations are the same as those outlined by policy.   
Interviews with staff and policy material, also emphasised together a specific women's 
culture, which somehow dictated that females, by definition, possess positive traits which men do 
not, who are consequently stigmatised as pathologically unreliable and untrustworthy. The support 
to a 'community' of women, which credit enables, thereby becomes constructed as the best way of 
ensuring repayment. Due also to the overall absence of any significant collateral or security found 
in communities, women targeting is also preferred, because of them being mainly situated in the 
household.45 Covertly, this is important, as in agreement with Rahman, it made women easier to 
trace and locate for collection and meetings. This was also enabled by their domestic habits being 
                                                 
44 GDCP: SCS, p.60. 
45 The need to minimise costs also goes against recording or valuating assets. The absence of tax records, receipts, 
written property rights and personal identification also make it difficult to assess individuals economic history.  
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forwarded and reproduced by support given to traditional activities, that all take place around the 
homestead. Although many men do however possess significant collateral in the form of housing, 
cattle and goats, policy reasons that they are unable to enforce repayments from them. Further, 
men’s own inability to pressure other men into payment, meant that group and peer pressure was 
understood not to work on male groups, as their interests are seen as strictly ex parte and individual. 
Conversely again, staff viewed women’s culture as placing a premium on the family, and holding 
(collective) social relations in very high regard, which meant that it was more shameful for females 
to default than for males. Thereby, ipso facto, women’s groups function better, are stronger and are 
more inclined to succeed. Loaning only to women also assumes that the household economy is 
sharply divided in terms of a male and female economic domain, and that women's access to credit 
and the exclusion of husbands will not lesson empowerment agendas or create domestic tensions. 
Contained in the policy assumption of a gendered separation of household economies then, are the 
further assumptions that firstly, any economic problems the husband experiences alone will not 
jeopardise the wife(s) ability to satisfy repayments, and secondly, that monies credited to females 
are under their control (despite bring married to untrustworthy males).  
The gendered construction of responsibility permeates ensuing loan design, as the 
encouragement of group cohesion also is assumed to provide intra-group pressure on defaulting 
individuals. This is because the loan cannot be renewed until all have paid. Credit allocation to 
women subsequently is understood as an empowering act in itself, that enables assigned responsible 
members of the populace, to fulfil their economic aspirations and the same empowering aspirations 
as the programme. This however also demands conceptualising women's groups as homogenous, 
where individual traits and endogenous dynamics are sidelined. Policy consequently stresses 
continually group unity, as both the entrance point for success, and also empowerment as the end 
result of group actions. The reproduction of homogenous groups is in the following section situated 
in the context of loan application processing.   
ANALYSIS OF GROUP LOAN APPLICATIONS AND LOAN APPROVAL  
The credit programme encourages communities to pool both social and economic 
capital in order that the group loan will be successful. The construction of loan groups is assumed to 
be a natural progression of already existing community practices, that group credit allocation will 
further strengthen. For senior staff whose job it is to approve group applications, the vital criteria 
for assessing loan worthiness centred on an animation report (see appendix 1 as an example of a 
typical animation report). This provides a very basic outline of the groups name, its membership, its 
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objectives, sources of income and expenditure. The example given in appendix one illustrates how, 
despite recognised problems of transport, marketing and none existent levels of training, the group 
is judged ’fit for credit.’ The report also does not question the source of the groups assets, and 
despite accepted ’low capital,’ assumes that credit can improve upon what certainly are structural 
traits, that lie outside the influence of the borrowing group itself. The non-recognition of relations 
between admitted structural constraints (transport and marketing) and the groups demand for credit, 
then leads up to the assumption that a forthcoming loan will enable the group to somehow 
overcome these issues, which are the main cause of (admitted) community difficulties. The purpose 
of the animation report, is thus in the main, only to outline and describe the group’s plans and 
activities, as an element in group construction itself, while obstructions to the fulfilment of these 
objectives are understood as challenges that can be overcome by credit provision and hard work. 
According to senior staff, the point termed Property of group/assets was the most important, from 
which to judge the group’s credit worthiness, based on the amount collected from the self-selection 
process, which then acted as a form of deposit and guarantee against default. Typically, this was 
about two thirds the amount of a single members loan.   
In reality however, there was no inclination nor ability on the part of staff to check 
where these monies originated from, and interviews with borrowers revealed that many raised the 
cash for the collective fund from other family members. As such there was a discrepancy, between 
Simli Pong assuming that payment to the collective fund allowed an identification of ’serious 
groups’ (able, willing and capable), and informants, who, had simply borrowed money to fulfil the 
self-selection process. So, as a whole, the question of credit worthiness really focused on an 
assumption that borrowers had an ability to draw further off of social networks for economic 
support, and application was not a litmus test of loaners own economic ability. During the 
application stage, the group would also be visited perhaps twice by staff and all group members 
would have to be present. The group would also have to satisfy staff that they meet regularly and 
discussed ventures, thereby reflecting an enactment of group unity and formation in the making, 
which was often frequently applauded by visiting staff as an socially empowering act. Thus group 
construction and reproduction through meetings, is understood as increasing members value in the 
group, and at the same time acts as a display of their unity. Further, the existence of a collective 
fund and regular group meetings is understood by staff  as a vital factor in diminishing risk, and 
increasing the likelihood of successful repayments. Group construction reflects then altogether how 
economic demands placed on the programme, also require the continual reproduction of a unified 
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group with social backup, without questioning individual members’ ability to actually repay the 
loan. Once the basic demand for a collective fund has been fulfilled and membership registered, a 
disbursement meeting is then called. The loan terms and conditions are thereafter read out, a talk is 
given by staff on the need to work hard together, and members are called up one at a time to give a 
signature or finger print for funds received, together with a receipt and savings book. In many ways 
the process of receiving monies is understood by both parties as a reward for mutual co-operation 
already achieved and benefit to come.  
Credit is then basically open to any group of women who can satisfy the social 
demands of self selection and small payments for the guarantee, together with the unifying 
principles set down in the application formula, and it is assumed that the group will be able to 
increase their income.46 
The following now details the success criteria employed by the credit programme. 
This is important because it reveals the degree to which each explicit objective is monitored, and 
allows an understanding of how applied indicators influence staff dispositions towards borrowers.   
ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT SUCCESS INDICATORS  
The indicators employed by GDCP/Simli Pong to measure operational reach and 
programme success concentrate only on quantifiable and statistical data, that reflects the detailed 
attention paid to finance sustainability. This is due to accepted difficulties in quantifying 
sociological improvements. In the phase 6 document GDCP, in this context writes that there are no 
indicators for ‘success’ and no means of verification; ‘...indicators are not given for achieving the 
development aims because there are none, which are precise enough whilst at the same time being easy to measure.’47 
The indicators employed instead consist of; the total amount of payments received at the end of any 
given year, the number of women applying and participating in training and loan applications, the 
loan repayment rates given as a total of the whole portfolio, the number of borrowers children 
enrolled in school and finally the amount of cash savings accrued from borrowers.48 These 
indicators consequently do not recognise if monies used for repayment (or schooling) stem from 
gains realised through credit, nor do they pursue the solving of underlying factors that fuel initial 
credit demand. High repayment rates are however assumed as reflecting an increase in income, and 
                                                 
46 Senior staff answered that credit ’had to be open to anyone of sound mind and body’ and saw no problem in 
allocating funds, provided a deposit was offered. 
47 GDCP; SCS, p.20. 
48 GDCP; SCS. pp. 60-65. Due to space limitations it has not been possible to pursue the assumed positive relations 
between credit provision and school enrolment. In short however, there was some evidence that monies allowed young 
children to attend school though many of the borrowers had grown up children, and several preferred to support male 
nephews rather then their daughters. 
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are understood as leading to increased school attendance. With this the utilised indicators are an 
important element in reproducing the understanding that programme expansion, and increases in 
loan group borrowing, has been equatable with community development.  
On a week-to-week basis, most statistical attention is paid to the number of groups 
and individuals who are (falling) behind with payments. These records however do not, as 
understood through staff interviews, stipulate exactly how long a loan should be overdue before it is 
classed as a default. Further, repayment is often registered or understood as 'satisfactory,' even 
though the specific repayment may not have been made at the time the statistics are produced. On 
these occasions the good word of the borrower and the judgement of the loan officer is taken as 
solid enough material, in order to improve the standard of overall repayment statistics.49 This was 
especially prevalent up to the new year, as pressure on loan officers to collect often meant that a 
promised (unpaid) repayment was registered as satisfactory.50 Repayment statistics given in internal 
literature, varied subsequently from around 80% to 98%, and was only really a reflection of the 
focus put on these statistics, as it negated the origin of the very repayments.51  
The emphasis on repayment ability and registration meant as well that the underlying 
reasons leading to payment problems are often not addressed, and that the overriding concern is to 
produce a good balance sheet. Here loan officers felt that them doing a good job rested substantially 
on their overall collection rates, and in practice they were not concerned whether other family 
members had paid the instalment. In the context of this paper however, it is less relevant that the 
repayment statistics could be inaccurate, but much more to the point, that the emphasis on 
repayment was a central indicator for programme success. One senior member of staff stressed this 
by saying; ‘It is not our concern where the money comes from, what is important is that they pay 
and they pay on time. We cannot trace where the repayment comes from.’ In total the hidden agenda 
here is to present good economic figures and neglect the extent to which borrowers ability to repay 
is based on their income increasing. Having recognised the main indicators the programme utilises, 
it is now relevant to identify in better detail the problematic groups where interviews were carried 
out, defined from their repayment records.  
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFAULT GROUPS 
                                                 
49 Interview with senior GDCP staff.  
50 Although two loan officers accepted this practice taking place it was not possible to recognise the extent to which it 
occurred. 
51 This variation was also due to the time of year measurement is taken. Semi-annual figures from May-June are always 
lower than those taken at the end of the year due to the slump experienced during the lean season months.  
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Of the 180 active groups in December 2005, it was found that 39 (22%) were 
experiencing some kind of default, albeit of very contrasting intensities, which indicated 
immediately that application formulas were insufficient to guarantee credit worthiness. In terms of 
varying default time scales, it was found by aggregating different data, that 12 groups in total had 
owed monies for approximately 6 months, 5 for three months, 9 groups for between two and three 
months, and finally 13 groups were one month late in repayment, as of December 2005. 52 
From this the informants were selected from the following groups.  
Group A had 34% and Group B had 46% of their total loan, including interest, still outstanding 6 
months after their loan was due. 
Group C had 44% of their total loan outstanding, three months after their loan was due.  
Group D had 5% outstanding also three months after the loan was due. 
Group E had 22% still outstanding and were one month overdue. 
And finally Group F had 36% still outstanding, again one month after their last payment was due.  
SUMMARY  
In agreement with Mayoux, this chapter has recognised that the main principle for the 
GDCP/Simli Pong credit allocation programme is the demand of financial self-sustainability. This 
rests on a logical framework approach supported by a number of assumptions, that are perceived to 
fulfil the other policy objectives of women’s empowerment and poverty reduction. It is understood 
that these are mutually reinforcing, and will facilitate linear developmental objectives. Based on 
policy documents and staff interviews, it is also  clear that, in agreement with Rahman, there are 
two parallel developmental discourses being pursued. The first is to fulfil the demands of Mayoux’s 
self-sustainability paradigm, while the second involves the construction and reproduction of certain 
community characteristics, which explicitly aim to satisfy contemporary developmental agendas of 
grassroots participation and women's empowerment. The objectives of poverty reduction and 
women’s empowerment are also attempted to be fulfilled, by allowing credit to almost any group of 
women, who have managed to socially organise themselves and satisfy the demands of group 
construction and application. Here is has been recognised that application procedures focus more on 
the assumed social empowering act of group formation itself, and are designed to keep transaction 
costs low, through collective responsibility. Similarly is the exclusion of men, which also requires 
the construction and reproduction of gender specific economic responsibilities. The emphasis on 
project finances is also revealed in the utilised indicators, which measure mainly repayment data 
                                                 
52 This was drawn up from a collection of separate records, concerning the extent of groups’ default, the groups 
designated activities, and the date of loan disbursement. 
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and places great emphasis on staff to maintain high collection rates which, it has been observed, 
also requires denying where repayment monies actually stem from. Based on the understanding that 
groups consist of homogenous members with common aspirations, it is further assumed that the 
group, as an economic organisation, can take maximum advantage of credit provision, provided 
they participate more fully in markets, and through it, local and individual poverty can be solved on 
these levels.   
As group reproduction serves the main programme requirement of self-sustainability, 
project staff also have a direct interest in serving a continued emphasis given to group co-operation 
and unity. The project emphasis on self-sustainability then influences staff’s dispositions to forward 
group cohesion, which again should be seen in the context of pressure to increase the loan portfolio, 
and associated indicators that assume expansion is equatable to community empowerment. In total 
the observations highlight how institutions create themselves the parameters of what constitutes 
development. From staff’s point of view then, group success becomes  purported to lie in members 
internalising the positive traits of group unity, emphasised to them through contact with the 
programme. Due to group construction being a vital element of loan approval itself, communities 
are similarly encouraged to promote themselves as a homogenous group, which demands that 
members have to downplay any internal disparities,  and trust that credit allocation will enable these 
to be overcome. In sum, application procedures reveal how group construction is seen as an 
economic and socially empowering act in itself, and the prism through which income will increase.  
Having presented the central programme characteristics, the next chapter now details 
the location of the borrowing communities, both on  local, district and regional levels.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS  
This chapter presents the relevant endogenous and exogenous characteristics prevalent 
on household, district and regional levels, which covers infrastructure, community access to 
amenities and resources, literacy, health and demographic indicators, the seasonally conditioned 
production base and broad political features.   
BROAD DESCRIPTION OF THE NORTHERN REGION 
The north’s economy is overwhelmingly agriculturally based, where livestock but 
principally subsidence farming dominates, which is characterised by very low wages. Other sectors 
are markedly absent in the north.53  Overall the region’s (under) development has since the colonial 
period been hampered by a number of interrelated factors that have not been overcome. Here can be 
named  a lack of economic investment, general political neglect, communal conflict, a harsh 
climate, generally poor soil quality, high costs of agricultural inputs and crop pests and disease.54 
The subsistence economy is also reflected in very low levels of formal employment and a 
substantial percentage of the populace who have never attended school.55  
The administrative Northern Region of Ghana is the largest in the country and covers 
approximately 30% of Ghana’s entire land mass, but is by far still the least populated, despite 
population growth rates recently described as ’high’ at over 2.7% per annum.56  Land pressure and 
related disputes over resource control continue to be a significant problem for most of the region. 57 
The area of research covered a small part of the Tolon-Kumbungu district in 
Dagomba, whose people form the largest population group in the region. According to the 
Government census of 2000, the Dagomba numbered just under 33% of the regional total at just 
                                                 
53 Overall Ghana’s economy today is significantly dependent on foreign aid and is constrained by a large deficit, 
measuring in 2000 3.6% of GDP. The agricultural sector contributed in 2000 39.6% of GDP to the economy, and 
accounted for some 70% of employment. Mining, predominantly in the south, in the same year raised around a seventh 
of this figure to GDP, while industry produced about two-thirds of that of agriculture. 
Codjoe, pp.1-10. 
54 See for example Codjoe 2004, Danida 2004, Staniland 1975, Kay 1972, Dickson 1968.   
55 For all intents and purposes concepts such as employment and unemployment are difficult to apply in the north. Most 
of the males I spoke to in the district could be categorised as severely underemployed. Northern region school 
enrolments in 1998 were about one third that of the national average, though in more recent years has improved.   
56 According to the 2000 census, the northern region had 25.7 persons per square kilometre, which was one third that of 
the national average of 78.9. Codjoe, pp.1-15. 
57 Population growth has further aggravated pressure on land because of increased use and need of firewood and 
charcoal, resulting in depletion of vegetation, deforestation and increased soil erosion. Codjoe, p.11. Northern 
population growth is attributed to moderately declining fertility and mortality rates since the early 1970’s, and migration 
from neighbouring countries. By 2000 the official Ghanaian census put the Dagomba population in the Northern region 
at 32.9% of the total in this region, numbering just under 600,000.Codjoe, p.9, Hippolyt, p.3. 
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over 1.8 million.58 The Dagomba are part of the Mole-Dagbane language group and represent about 
3.5% of the country’s total population. As north-south structural inequalities have persisted, 
differing levels of infrastructure that initially have deterred northern investment, also act to 
perpetuate the region’s marginalisation.59 
DISTRICT INFRASTRUCTURE, HEALTH AND SOCIAL INDICATORS 
Compared to more outlying rural areas and indeed the regional capital Tamale, the 
communities visited generally had few problems with either electricity or water, due to a relatively 
stable power grid and their proximity to a large water pumping station. Approximately  80% of 
households questioned had some form of electricity, which was most often used for dim lighting.60 
Water was from standpipes up to 500m away from homesteads. Despite quite regular water 
provision in the district, sanitation and drainage systems are practically non-existent, giving 
common health problems.61  
All informants lived in either circular or rectangular mud houses (ca.15 sq.m.) with 
straw roofs. These units were grouped together, and made up larger circular compounds with a 
single entrance, comprising in total of up to 15 or so such houses, where perhaps three generations 
of the same family lived. Within each compound, food was prepared on an open fire in the middle 
for communal cooking. Between compounds were small plots of tobacco, maize and yam and the 
occasional mango tree. Most of the homesteads interviewed were no more than a 20 minute walk 
from a severely potholed dirt road linking Nawuni to Tamale (see appendix 3). Bare the odd NGO 
land cruiser peddling to and from Tamale, the dire standard of the road was only superseded by the 
decrepitude of the transport plying it.62 For all groups, a very significant problem was consequently 
market access and transport, which was very slow, irregular, unreliable and expensive. 
A striking characteristic of the northern region is its very young age, giving a high 
dependency ratio of 1:1, meaning that for every productive household member, there is one other 
                                                 
58 Hippolyt, p.1-4. 
59 A simple example will suffice; In a recent television debate on Ghana State Television, leading northern politicians 
complained that Greater Accra districts had attracted some 98% of foreign investment from 2000-2005, due mainly to 
superior existing infrastructure. In 2002 however, the soft drinks giant, The Coke Cola Company, was forced to 
abandon plans for a large bottling and distribution plant in the northern region’s capital Tamale, due to the southern 
based NPP government, not being able or willing to guarantee the required water supply. As a result the plant was built 
in the Accra metropolis. 'Talking Point.' Broadcast on Ghana State Television 5th February 2006. 
60 During the field research no form of refrigeration was seen whatsoever, and no other system of cooking witnessed 
other then open fires burning either firewood and/or charcoal, while bottled gas was available but expensive and rarely 
used.  
61 UNICEF estimated in 1999 that 90% of Tolon-Kumbungu residents used 'free range' toilets, while only 1% had 
access to a flushing water closet. Similarly, 90% of waste water from cooking, washing et al flowed freely, contributing 
to an estimated 65% of available water in the district being judged 'unsafe for drinking.' UNICEF 1999, pp.10-30. 
62 Serious accidents occurred  almost weekly during the three month trip involving pedestrians, cyclists, motorbikes, 
buses and open lorries with passengers. 
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unproductive, he/she has to provide for.63 In the communities visited in this study, children with 
swelled bellies were a common sight, as were aged dependants and significant numbers of 
economically inactive males between the ages of say, 15 and 40.64 
RESOURCE CONTROL: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 
In order to comprehend communities socio-economic organisation, it is relevant to 
outline some basic principles of land control in the northern region. Land in Dagomba is vested in 
the local chief, whose position forms part of a much larger pyramidal hierarchy of  divisional chiefs, 
leading to the Paramount chief himself, the Ya-Na. The local chief has the authority to distribute 
land more or less as he sees fit, provided that the existing pattern of distribution and land use is not 
upset. Land claims can be made on any area that is not obviously being put to use, and the chief can 
then sanction usage but not outright ownership.65 The extent to which this system hinders northern 
women’s access to land and their own economic aspirations is however open to debate. Kasanga 
(2002) writes here that constraints are not gendered related and; ‘given that land is available (in the north) 
there is no apparent discrimination against women.’
66 Aryeety (2002) however writes that women’s; ‘access 
without control weakens the potential for empowerment and innovation among the affected groups.’ 67 That land 
holding is a vital element in the structuration of the northern patriarchal society where polygamy is 
widely practised, was immediately noticeable in this study, in that only 2 out of the 22 women 
informants (who were both widows) saw themselves as independent farmers.68 All others access to 
land, which centred on picking shea, ground nuts and collecting firewood, took place on the basis of 
a first come first served principle, though it was clearly not permissible for strangers to suddenly 
descend on an area. It was therefore vital for women to be continually on the forage on unfarmed 
savannah areas, where these products were found in the wild, to gather resources at the right time. 
In cases where husbands ‘owned’ land, wives had exclusive access to the resources found there. In 
sum, economic trees and bushes belonged to the community, though there was clearly a number of 
                                                 
63 A 1999 UNICEF baseline report carried out on 600 households in this district, gave 16.7% of the population as being 
under 5 years of age and a very high 47.7% being under the age of 15. UNICEF 1999. 
64 Out of the UNICEF baseline survey which covered a total of 634 under fives, 53% were characterised as stunted (a 
low height for age ratio) and 33% were categorised as underweight (low weight for age ratio). UNICEF 1999, p. 39. 
65 Land titles are subsequently not absolute but allodial, meaning they are vested in particular families, lineages and/or 
the chiefs community itself, called the skin.  
66 Kasanga 2001, p.29. 
67 Aryeety 2002, p.86. In Toulin, Delville and Traore, 2002.  
68 The extent to which women's access to resources is dependent on relations with patriarchal structures is given by the 
UNICEF baseline report of 1999, which, out of 600 households covered gives the figure of only 1.8% of households 
that were female headed. UNICEF 1999, p.16. 
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unwritten rules which had to be abided by.69 There was also one example of a third widow fearing 
that her deceased husband’s land would eventually be taken by senior male relatives and she be 
allocated poorer farming land, which is common practice. Women’s farms are generally also 
smaller and further away from homesteads then male-farmed land and women produce mainly for 
consumption while male controlled farms centre on production for sale.70 Shea trees are in 
abundance and grow evenly spread, ground nuts to a lesser extent, while rice from none family land 
is purchased mainly from larger producers.  
All the borrowing communities could be termed as holding family farms, which were 
relatively small in size (often between 1-2 hectares), and males produced mainly millet, maize, 
guinea-corn, sorghum, yam, tobacco, cassava and/or rice where irrigation was possible.  
SEASONAL PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES  
 All the groups participated in either shea butter processing, parboiling rice, ground nut 
processing and/or petty trading. The processing activities are heavily influenced by the single 
annual rain season which typically lasts from April to October, after which the temperature 
increases gradually and reaches its peak in February (see appendix 4). In any given year December, 
usually one of the driest months, should also be a relatively 'easy' time in terms of food supply and 
income sources. This is because the harvest months of June, July and August should have provided 
households and markets with enough cheap produce to last throughout the dry season. Around 
December, rice and ground nuts have also just been harvested, resulting, again in normal years, to 
stables being reasonably plentiful and cheap at this time. Reflecting the intimate relationship 
between the climate and market conjunctures, the last month or so of the dry season and as well the 
first rain season period are known as the lean months. This is because, starting typically from 
April/May, planting has just been carried out, and many households experience hardship because 
they only have what they have managed to accumulate from the previous September-November 
harvests.71 In recent years food shortages have arisen due to the promotion of large scale cash-
cropping for export and mono-culture, while trade liberalisation has also resulted in periodic 
flooding of markets, and imported chickens, sugar, corn and rice.  
As stocks begin to decline through the dry season, market prices rise accordingly, and 
continue their accent, as demand increases for the less available stables. Price can increase right up 
                                                 
69 For example not being allowed to fell economic or young trees, and  that nuts could not be picked before they were 
ripe, nor exclusive claims made on them.  
70 See Canagarajah and Bhattamishra 2002, Doss 2002, Fallon 2003.  
71 Typical dry season farm activities also involve the collecting of excess long grasses from cultivated rice paddies, 
which are tied and stacked for either storage, fodder, sale or re-thatching roofs before the rains starts.   
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to the time of new produce becoming once again available in markets, following harvest from 
around June again. Taking the seasonal cycles as a whole, it is not uncommon for agricultural 
produce to triple in price from the time of the initial harvest, from the onset of the dry and lean 
season up to the days when fresh produce once again appears.  
In the dry months from November/December to April, there is an increased pressure 
on women to supplement the household economy with their processing activities, using shea nuts, 
ground nuts and rice. Ground nuts are harvested from October, rice from November and shea butter 
processed from December to February. In sketch form these seasonal activities and price 
fluctuations are given in appendix 5. All the borrowing informants said that 2005 had been no more 
than a ‘reasonable year,’ due to insufficient rain. As explained in the previous chapter, loan 
disbursement is designed to coincide and compensate for these seasonal asymmetries which cause 
hardship. Funds allocated from June for example, aim to provide funding for shea butter processing, 
a task subsequently carried out by many in the period immediately after the planting of other crops. 
Similarly, the ground nut harvest and disbursement of loans for processing starts from September, 
and loans for rice processing are timed to coincide with the rice harvest from the end of November. 
Consequently, it is the programmes objective to provide communities with the means to be able to 
fund purchases of these products for investments at the most favourable time of year, at harvest, in 
order for borrowers to be able to take maximum advantage of varying supplies and demand in the 
following months. 
Due to these seasonal activities giving often varied, irregular and unpredictable levels 
of income, social organisation was based on smoothing out these fluctuations and embedding 
mutual community support. Family and community contributions (mostly in kind) were common in 
hard times. As such the capital of these  exchanges lay in the time interval between help, and not in 
the exchanges themselves. This was because the interval between exchanges, assured both parties of 
mutual support. One informant answered here that; ‘if you eat on your own you will die on your own.’ Put 
another way, those with resources had a social obligation to ease the hardship of others during the 
lean season, which enabled the assurance of future help.     
SHEA, RICE AND GROUND NUT MARKET CHARACTERISTICS  
 The traditional processing economic activities, that the project supports 
(notwithstanding micro-credit allocation itself), are all considerably credit based markets, which 
characterises relations between the rural based processors themselves and their customers and 
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suppliers.72 Due to insufficient production on family lands, processors access to particularly rice, 
but also shea and ground nut, is very much conditioned by cash payments. This is because the very 
large number of rice, shea and ground nut processors, means that it is very difficult for processors to 
purchase produce on credit. For the buyers of the their finished, processed products however, the 
opposite is true. Here, the large number of processors, who chase a limited number of customers, 
means that customers can easily demand credit from the individual processors, or simply go 
elsewhere. Processors can only demand cash payments from their own customers, if they are strong 
enough to guarantee a regular supply at a favourable price, which most are not able to do. Similarly, 
and again especially regarding rice, the processors can only demand credit from their suppliers, if 
they purchase regularly and relatively large amounts, which again, most can not do. Hence credit 
demand from Simli Pong was driven by the need to fill in these payment gaps, as it was often the 
case that processors had monies owed to them from customers, and couldn’t both purchase more 
stock for processing, and fulfil loan repayment demands, until these arrived. Many answered that 
additionally, collecting debts and payments from customers, often meant returning to otherwise 
unfavourable markets.73  
GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOUR AND POWER 
-THE MALE DOMAIN 
There is a very noticeable gendered division of power found in northern Ghana, that is 
structured through patriarchal relations, polygamous marriage, the traditional chieftaincy system 
itself, and as well on specific notions of Islam. As well as having predominant control over the (re) 
distribution of resources, in broad terms men have the economic responsibility of providing for long 
term family necessities; housing, securing the staples for everyday consumption for wives, children 
and frequently a number of other family dependants as well. Men’s economic domain generally also 
covers the expenses of important social functions such as funerals, weddings and naming 
ceremonies for children, though many women informants explained that the cost of these social 
ceremonies was often divided, depending on the success of their own economic activities. Most of 
the informant’s husband’s farmed 2-3 staples out of the range described above, while the quality of 
their farmland and importantly the distance to the homestead varied considerably from between 'a 
                                                 
72 The development and furthering of these credit markets are based on a number of interrelated factors; the subsistence 
base of the economy itself, a subsequent lack of capital, the annual one season harvest, price fluctuations, low profits, 
and a lack of storage facilities and transport. The receivers of micro-credit have a varied customer base which is 
predominantly a domestic market, but still ranges from neighbours, to local agents and finally some larger export outlets 
based in Tamale or further north.  
73 Informants said that although payment was always forthcoming from customers, it could take over a month to collect 
outstanding monies for delivered processed goods. 
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five minute walk' to up to '6 miles away’. The most frequent problems raised concerning their 
husband’s production, concerned general input constraints; weeds, low fertility levels, distance, 
water access, a need of new and better farm tools and lastly high prices for hiring bullocks for 
seasonal ploughing. When asking men about the division of responsibility concerning food 
provision, the answer given several times was that;  'the women must provide the ingredients,' or 'the things 
that make the food sweet,' or the 'house’s small benefits.'  Many female informants however (contrary to 
assumptions) spoke of having to support their husbands farms. It can generally be said that men 
have an absolute monopoly over the simplest of tasks, that involve even the slightest degree of 
technical know-how, which reflected symbols of masculinity.74  
WOMENS SOCIAL DOMAIN AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
Reflecting women's subordinate economic status, all married informants said they 
would not have been able to borrow money if it wasn't for their husbands permission. This was 
rationalised along the lines of 'because if the wife dies the husband is responsible for the debt.' Asked if it was 
at all possible to join without their husband’s consent, one large group of informants all shook their 
heads simultaneously that it was not. This answer was also given by 3 wives of the same man, who 
were all members of the same group. When asked about their admitted, limited knowledge of their 
husband’s earnings, and what would happen if he died owing a large debt he hadn't told them about, 
they admitted together that this could easily have serious consequences for them all. This revealed 
how economic openness was demanded by husbands, but not disclosed by themselves, and 
demonstrated women’s disposition to accept this, though not necessarily agreeing with it.  
Women’s realm of control is based largely in and around the household itself. Shea, 
rice and ground nut processing are all very time consuming, laborious activities, which involve little 
technology, demand a good deal of patience and endurance, and are finally all exceptionally passive 
activities. Besides this borrowing groups close to urban areas also partake in 'petty trading', which 
covers the street selling of anything from boiled sweets, cheap imported shampoos or low quality 
soaps to plastic flip flops.75 Women’s domestic tasks also cover the tenets of traditional household 
responsibilities and chores; looking after children and any aged relatives, cooking, cleaning, 
washing, collecting firewood and water, together with the continuous pounding of cassava, yam, 
millet, maize and sorghum, churning shea butter and drying out rice and pealing ground nuts. It was 
                                                 
74 Fixing a bicycle for example, sharpening a machete and butchery, fishing, felling a large tree, repairing a wall, 
thatching a roof, taxi or bus driving, riding a motorbike, filling these with petrol and not least being allowed to sit at the 
front in a bus or taxi. 
75 Basically anything reasonably small with a low unit cost that can be carried around from market to bus station on 
their heads in large containers. 
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extremely rare to see men or boys over the age of around 10 doing any of the above activities, many 
of which are surrounded by a number of unquestioned gender roles and taboos.76 As a supplement 
or an important alternative to the processes named above, many women also produced charcoal, 
collected and sold firewood and/or produced kenke (boiled maize served in a leaf).  
Women’s ideal traits ensure that she would take part in the 'processes' of life, while 
men are the ‘producers’ and ‘providers’ of life. Men consequently are predisposed to take control 
over life's 'events.' This demands women's respect and assigns males with social status, prestige and 
symbolic power. Women are in the main not worth more than the men of her lineage and their 
status is generally generated from the social capital their participation in life's processes allows, 
while their being bounded by the domestic realm limits considerably their autonomy. This 
embedded division, and wives subordinate status, was aptly described by one informant who had 
been married ‘all her life,’ who replied, showing no signs of bitterness, resentment of self-pity that; 
'I can't remember how many times I have carried my husband’s rice to market, but he has never let me see him sell it.'   
These dispositions pose the biggest challenges to the micro-credit programme 
fulfilling its own objectives of poverty alleviation and women's empowerment, while there was 
clear evidence that tasks undertaken by women in borrowing groups, encouraged by the 
programme, to a high degree reproduced this traditional division of labour, and posed little threat to 
related gendered power divisions. Here it seems that the credit project, although outwardly 
purporting and forwarding a modernisation of traditional structures, in fact draws heavily on these 
traditional institutional characteristics, in the hope that credit provision, as modernisation, will 
somehow overcome the negative aspects assigned to the very traditional divisions. The significance 
of this is taken up now in the next chapters, as we trace how group construction reproduces 
community power relations.   
 
                                                 
76 Demonstrating these embedded, gendered dispositions, on asking a man why only women collect and carry water for 
example, the answer given was that; ‘...men can’t carry buckets because their heads are not flat enough...’ It was also 
answered that; 'Women have very special glands in their neck which makes them carry it easier. Men want to do it but 
its dangerous to do it without (them).'  Conversely, men seen carrying water, firewood or preparing food could be 
teased and called bachelors. On another occasion, a female informant joked at a man carrying water and laughed, 
‘where is your wife!’ 
 40
CHAPTER SIX 
This chapter concentrates on disparities between factors influencing individual’s 
credit demand, and policy assumptions concerning loan applications and group construction, based 
on self sustainability. It is shown that economically weak individuals secure positions in loaning 
groups, by drawing on existing social networks, which fulfils the social developmental objective of 
empowerment. But the aim of poverty reduction meanwhile becomes undermined, as self 
sustainability builds on existing community power relations and embedded dispositions.  
REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL STATUS AND COMMON GROUP TRAITS  
Before detailing individual cases the following identifies significant common traits 
found between the groups and relates these to policy designs. All expressed gratitude for the loan, 
though most said the actual amount was insufficient to cover needs. The vast majority of both 
would be members and actual borrowing individuals moreover were relatively old, and, conditioned 
by the factors described previously, many were not particularly economically active. Their 
subsistence base, giving a low production surplus, also meant that there was barely any noticeable 
material differences between the informants visited. Group members’ ages and especially the older 
age still of most of the groups’ executives, was generally seen by Simli Pong as more of a benefit 
than a problem, as it was easier to gain contact with communities through them, due to their social 
status, and their level of respect and trustworthiness. As discussed previously, older women’s status 
also helped keep transaction costs low. The majority of informants also had more than four 
children, many of whom were grown up and had left the area. Again this was not seen as a problem 
by the programme, despite the explicit policy objective to provide funding for especially younger 
children's schooling.77 It was further not seen as a problem, that targeting older generations also 
meant that there was a higher then otherwise propensity for illness, and that many informants had 
elderly dependants. Members also had more expensive responsibilities in terms of paying for 
frequent social ceremonies, and interviews revealed that many had help in accruing the funds for the 
self-selection process from other family members. There was consequently no correlation made by 
policy design between transaction costs possibly rising due to sickness and ill health of either older 
members or their dependants, the specific and deliberate targeting of relatively old women, and 
                                                 
77 Due to economic circulation, households with males over school age generally faired better than those without. These 
better endowed households faired better still if they had good market access, as semi-urban groups for instance 
experienced every day as a potential market day. This gave positive and reinforcing developments for socially strong 
and better geographically placed households. For socially and spatially isolated households meanwhile the opposite was 
true. Transport and market problems were confounded by children moving away to urban areas,  which lessened social 
capital and avenues of possible economic support.  
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finally their limited economic ambitions. Here it could be witnessed that the main project objective 
was to expand and try to ensure that funds could be recovered, by utilising village social capital to 
the full. Older members allowed than the social objective to be fulfilled, but this also meant that 
younger, and  more resourceful women were in the main excluded.    
One hidden transcript was subsequently that the targeting of the older generations 
would lesson project risks, because it was assumed these had greater and stronger access to social 
networks and family, who could be drawn upon in the event of default. On the other hand the 
accessing of mainly older members, meant that the borrowers were not very adaptable, 
entrepreneurial, nor particularly impressionable towards new ideas. This was based on women’s 
inability to control significantly their access to resources, while market constraints also made it 
difficult to develop economic relations, resulting in social capital, based on age, being the most 
important criteria of community status. As the targeting of elders, and the forwarding of traditional 
activities went hand in hand, the tasks of group construction and animation were also eased, 
because this occurred under the control of the communities’ older women.78 This meant as well that 
policy design relied on and reproduced the Magazias’ symbolic strength, in order to unify the 
group, and apply group pressure, despite these leaders social characteristics, by definition, often 
constituting a barrier to the attainment of individual members aspirations of increasing their own 
economic wealth. Success in the sense of group construction and disbursement of monies through  
animation and application, lie as a result in the ability of individual members to access and utilise 
social networks, which were compatible with the executive’s interests.   
In all cases as well, the first and most significant obstacle to group membership was 
for individuals to get their husband’s accept. This especially meant that older women also had more 
flexibility, in that a few were widows and many others (aged) husbands were glad that a loan could 
be provided.79 Younger women’s husbands meanwhile were less happy that their wives should join 
a group, as this carried an implication that they could not fulfil their household economic 
obligations. It was also shameful that young wives should have to borrow money from elsewhere 
and network older women. In total then, access to credit was structured on the basis of existing 
community power, firstly conditioned by wife-spouse relations, and secondly by individual’s 
                                                 
78 Practically every new interaction with a community would go through the Magazia first and on meeting someone else 
one would always be referred to her house. 
79 Men’s opinion of their (older) wife(s) borrowing was subsequently mostly very positive, as it provided an opportunity 
for easing (older) males household burdens, while these retained influence over spending and ultimately resource 
control, as borrowers participated in traditional activities. 
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relations with the older women in the community, while the most viable economic resources (young 
men and women), who were politically weak, were sidelined. There was here noticeable generation 
taboos which further influenced group membership, in that younger women kept a distance to the 
Magazia, because these were seen as having lost the beauty and exuberance of youth. Also, some 
younger women in communities were not at all interested in joining a lending group, where their 
elderly aunts, mother, or mother in law could tell them what to do. Despite the fact that younger 
women could have benefited arguably more, these were in the main denied access to credit. The 
allocation of credit was consequently constructed in such a way as to preserve generational divides, 
and status was awarded to elders, who also were the main benefactors.  
Group construction therefore reproduced the existing patriarchal society and female 
power based on social strength, because the relatively inactive, older females posed little threat to 
men’s established control over household development. Subsequently, the objective of reducing 
poverty was prioritised in practice lower than programme self-sustainability, as communities social 
strength was used to construct groups, that was often not primed for economic accumulation. In 
order to spread risk the programme also endeavoured to attract group members from as many 
different families as possible. But for the groups interviewed it was not unusual for two or three 
wives from the same compound and /or mothers and daughter(s) to be in the same group. This 
indicated how older women could retain control over daughters by bringing them into the group, 
and how significant social capital in group membership could be. Most informants said that they 
had a history of social organisation in the form of extended family and communal events such as 
funerals, weddings and child naming ceremonies, but significantly none had any history of 
economic organisation based on more than five individuals working together, to process shea butter, 
rice or ground nuts. The main consequence of this (taken up in the next chapter) was that group 
reproduction could significantly affect individual’s aspirations, especially if one or two members 
experienced repayment problems, through the project encouraging traditional vocations.80 When 
asked on the merits of actual Magazia regarding the demands of self-sustainability, the loan 
supervisor conceded that they were probably not the best individuals to work with in terms of 
economic development. They were however honest, had good contacts and experience and besides;  
'group formation has to be open for everybody,’ although it was conceded that in practice, this meant the 
                                                 
80 This also helped keep training costs down. Training was mainly open to the groups executive and could comprise of 2 
or 3 days stay at the GDCP headquarters, where they were educated on the merits of group unity, leadership skills and 
markets. It was accepted that education for more varied activities would necessitate the designing of many different 
courses which would increase costs. 
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exclusion of many younger powers. In sum it was assumed that older women’s social capital, with 
training, could be translated into group economic success, and that the main obstacle to the 
attainment of this was members ‘not working hard enough.’81  
Having outlined the most significant common traits regarding groups, the following 
now gives four case studies reflecting how endogenous factors influence individual’s demand for 
credit, and relates this to loan applications and group construction.  
INDIVIDUAL AND INTRA-GROUP DISPARITIES  
There are basically four general categorisations made from the problematic groups, 
which are exemplified. Case 1; individuals who access a loan to offset past negative experiences. 
Case 2; successful individuals who are held back by others, more disadvantageous household traits. 
Case 3; individual’s who access a loan to further social networks, and finally Case 4; individual’s 
who access a loan to offset expected future expenditures. The relevance of the categorisations lies in 
them demonstrating that the continued emphasis of group unity, cohesion and homogeneity 
becomes strained and undermined by household and individual heterogeneous factors. 
-OVERCOMING PAST FAILURES 
Case 1.  Mariyama (group D) was waiting eagerly at the end of January for her second loan. Though as a shea 
butter processor, she is aware that she may have to wait some months before the loan is forthcoming, which  normally is 
disbursed around the time of the arrival of the first shea fruits in May. She has 8 children aged between 7 and 31, 3 of 
which are of school age. She also has to support  2 male nephews with their school fees. She is an only wife and her 
husband only contributes when things get very difficult. Also in the loan group are 2 sisters, one of which is the leader, 
and two are her husband’s brothers’ wives. Her  untimely request for a loan stems from losses on her husband’s farm 
the previous season, that necessitated the sale of a cow in the dry season while prices were low, which raised some 
600,000 cedis (ca £.40). This money has now been used and a new loan is needed out of season to strengthen the farm 
before shea processing can begin again. Her net profit from shea butter processing is around 50000 cedis (ca.£3 ) a 
month.     
The most notable material from Mariyama's account is the demand for a second loan 
out of season, stemming from the need to recuperate family losses experienced the previous year. 
Additionally, although she clearly had social support from her family, which assured membership, 
this did not extend to financial loss coverage. This is significant as it illustrates that group unity had 
limited economic capability. In effect, her need of an untimely second loan to cover losses, reflected 
how the household’s level of vulnerability had actually increased, as both her and her husband 
reasoned that a loan renewal was the best option to make up for the losses. Here though, her ability 
to repay a second loan becomes conditioned by it firstly having to cover her husbands loss, and then 
also being based on the future shea harvest, which is still some months away. Also relevant is the 
fact that the actual disbursement of the second loan would not call into question her increased  
                                                 
81 From staff interviews, there was no understanding whatsoever that groups might not be able to overcome constraining 
forces.  
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vulnerable status, as it is only the first loan period that animation and application concentrates on. 
The demand for a new loan is here in fact not to increase economic activity, but to keep the 
household at its present level, and to avoid further farm losses and livestock sales, in the hope that 
this season will be an improvement on the last. This relatively inexperienced shea processor 
embarked on a loan, after being advised by older members, and in effect was investing in an 
uncertain venture, where the outcome was by no means secure.  
The informant had clearly been influenced by previous seasons calamities which, she 
assumed, could be recovered by group membership and a loan. In total the account shows that 
individual’s (female) social capital secured loan provision, as it was also certain that this member 
could not have joined, if it wasn’t for her older sister being the group leader. For the project, this 
was assumed to make default less likely, as these relations could be relied upon for mutual 
economic backing. In practice however, family ties could be more of a disadvantage, as the social 
capital meant bringing in a relatively weak individual, whose economic problems could not be 
solved through the groups social unity.     
-INDIVIDUAL SUCCESS CONDITIONED BY DISBURSEMENT TIMING 
 
Case 2.  Napari (group F) is a rice processor and at present (December) she is (also) waiting for a new loan, after 
having finished paying off the previous one successfully, but is frustrated that she has to wait for others to finish paying 
before the new loan is forthcoming. She currently has one 40kg bag of rice left for processing and sale, the profit from 
which she plans to make last until the rest of the group has finished paying. She explains that it is a problem that almost 
all compete in the same markets and some are more lucky than others, answering that; 'the group is only a group for 
loans and not other things (...) people work separately which is better for business (...) to work together creates 
problems (...) laziness and other things.' She reasons that as long as the loan arrives while prices are still low, the season 
should be fine.  
 
In contrast to the first narrative, this testimony illustrates that the informant’s success 
and aspirations for the next, risk being jeopardised by other borrowers bad luck or their inability to 
realise profits. Clearly an individual who is anxious to get on with things, Napari’s relative success 
has inadvertently led to her future success being conditioned by the rest of the group fulfilling their 
payment obligations as a whole, as this dictates crucially whether the planned second loan will 
arrive on time or not. Working best as an individual was also conditioned by the nature of rice 
market competition itself, in that her own household success could be threatened by sharing 
business and customers with other group members. Her story reveals that the size of the group often 
results in strong individuals being restricted, by the need to keep the group moving forward 
together. This however limits the scope of successful individual’s activities, due to waiting for 
disbursement, and the presumption that group members have very similar starting points, common 
objectives, and definite interests in working together.   
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-GROUP MEMBERSHIP AS A SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
Case 3. Abibata (group D) describes how taking the loan helped offset having to sell one of her six sheep, 
which otherwise would have been necessary due to debts incurred by food shortages she experienced last year. The loan 
has not led her to become 'really busy' as hoped, though certainly has helped with providing pocket money and an 
occasional profit. This she has used on purchasing around 25 shiny, flowered, enamelled bowls of different sizes and 
several plastic preying mats, which she displays with great pleasure, and which she loans out for social events. She 
explains that she knew most of the group members beforehand, and everybody encouraged and financially supported 
each other through the process of self-selection, though she also knew a number of people who wanted to join but 
couldn’t fulfil these demands.  
 
This informant avoided answering whether financial help had enabled her to join the 
group, but it became clear from interviews with other group members that she had. Although she 
had also obviously experienced some degree of success, it was clear that her material purchases 
were made in order to exhibit signs of visible success to other people in the village. It was however 
less certain whether the purchases had been paid for from actual profit and not from the loan itself. 
On a second visit it became more apparent, that her reliance on social contacts, who had supported 
her economically to join the group and with repayments, led her to purchase material goods for the 
credit money. There were several motives for this. The material purchases were a way of 
‘controlling the money,’ thereby lessening the chance of it being spent by her husband. It was also a 
statement of her success to others who had not managed to secure membership, and it demonstrated 
that she enjoyed strong social support in the loan group. That the informant wasn’t that 
economically successful however, was revealed by her saying that she hadn’t become that busy, 
which many informants employed as a means of quantifying the level of their own perceived  
success.82 The implication I drew from this was that a good portion of the loan was used for 
material purchases, which symbolised the individual’s social standing, and which also legitimised 
and reproduced the social relations she relied upon.  This was because group affiliation rested on 
this individual’s ability to access friends and family for initial economic support to fulfil the self-
selection criteria. Here then membership (in contrast to the above cases), was centred on enhancing 
social ties, rather than being a means to procure income growth, or sustain present household levels. 
As the objective of group unity had been fulfilled though, the reproduction of social strength was 
separate and ultimately detrimental to the pursuit of increasing income.  
-ACCESSING CREDIT TO SECURE FUTURE COSTS 
Case 4. Salima (group F) is a group Magazia and waiting for a third loan. She explains that since September 
things haven’t been that easy, because she didn’t have money to buy sufficient ground nut stock while prices were still 
low. Up until the present, (February) ground nut prices are twice what they were at harvest time and still rising. This 
means that the forthcoming loan be used predominantly to purchase rice, which is still affordable and will allow more 
                                                 
82 To be ‘very busy’ was a metaphor to explain market gains and have regular customers, and signified that there was 
always some business to attend to.  
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stock to be bought. She explains that some members with savings have already purchased up to 6-10 bags of rice, and 
have started on other activities as well, just in case quality imported rice suddenly undercuts local processors, as 
sometimes happens. Waiting for disbursement is made the more anxious as this year is going to be expensive, first with 
one daughters wedding, then with two other daughters both expecting children. She estimates that together these three 
events will cost more than the total loan itself, and says her husband’s contribution will be minimal.83 She adds 
moreover, that the group works well together, saying that different levels of success, have meant that members help 
each other more now with social events and in hard times, though she doesn’t know if members lend each other money 
for repayments. She explains that in needy times like those experienced last year, food was exchanged amongst the 
group between strong and weak members, and a balance was found between meeting repayment demands and helping 
friends, though she explains that her husband had the final say in this.  
 
There are a number of significant features revealed by this informant, in the same 
group as case 2, concerning particularly relations to the rest of the group. Firstly, is that her socially 
symbolic position as group leader didn’t appear to carry any obvious economic advantage, and the 
two forms of capital could not be exchanged. Similar to the other cases, this further illustrates that 
household matters, and the nature of competitive markets, means that the group is mainly a social 
construction, formed to access credit and not based on existing economic organisation. Thus, her 
position as Magazia cannot be utilised as a means for assuring group economic success, which is 
otherwise assumed by project practice, that understands group unity as making economic gains 
much more probable. Here the development of intra-group economic disparities also adds to social 
pressure placed upon her.84 It is additionally significant that this informant differentiated on the one 
side between members assisting each other with the costs of social events and distribution of food in 
hard times, while on the other denied any knowledge of internal borrowing between members to 
make repayments.85 This indicated the conflictual nature of rice marketing, with limited numbers of 
customers and large numbers of processors. With this, the embedded significance of social 
networks, akin to Hyden’s economy of affection, developed separate from individuals’ private 
economic successes, and the two economies did not appear immediately to influence each other.86  
So, despite group membership requiring the mobilisation of social networks, increased 
economic activity that credit provision may allow, was kept separate due to household disparities 
                                                 
83 She answered that the wedding would cost about 400,000 cedis (£25) and the two births together would cost 20 
bowls of groundnuts, between 160-320,000 cedis, (£10-20) depending on the timing of the name-giving ceremonies. 
The total expenditure for these events was expected to be around 560-720,000, while the loan would give 500,000, with 
650,000 being repaid over a year including interest. 
84 This was clear from her eagerly awaiting disbursement, that she had to change from ground nut to rice processing, 
that other members had overtaken her economically, and finally that this season carried numerous extra costs. 
85 Several other informants made the same separation between strictly economic activities for the credit repayments and 
socio-economic exchanges. They said it was common to receive small loans, gifts and contributions from family and 
friends in cash and in kind but instalment was a household affair.   
86 This separation also demonstrates how it appeared unhonourable for economic exchanges to take place between 
women, because their forwarding of individual economic interests was not conductive to the reproduction of their social 
status. Goal orientated, individual economic endeavours were understood by especially the oldest members as 
threatening the social unity of the group.  
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and the market characteristics themselves. Economic activities to secure credit repayments were 
thereby understood by borrowers as generally an individual affair, because social capital could not 
be relied upon to accommodate the demands of regular loan instalments with interest, and 
community strength could not overcome market vulnerabilities. This is especially relevant when 
considering the programme assumption that group unity provides a foundation, from which 
economic development can spire. From most of the informants accounts, it became clear that groups 
provided only for the reproduction of social capital between long term friends and family members, 
which facilitated only small economic help for group self-selection.   
SUMMARY  
This chapter has recognised that programme self-sustainability and loan application 
formula reproduce group homogeneity, but this overlooks individual members’ different reasons for 
applying for a loan. Project design also assumes that social capital, invested in and through group 
formation, will translate into economic capital. In agreement with Adams, the cases demonstrate 
tensions between individual’s disparate starting points, the assumptions of group unity, and as well 
market realities. Here the project exaggerates the extent to which endogenous and exogenous 
factors can be overcome by group solidarity, which  becomes almost objectified as a means for 
forwarding economic growth. Building on Hyden, social capital is mainly separate from household 
economic ambitions, due to broader constraints and the fact that each member has different levels of 
capacity, interests and aspirations. This separation is further influenced by loan group participation 
not being able to accommodate embedded practices designed to offset these difficulties. The case 
studies have revealed here, that individuals may join groups in order to offset previous seasons 
failures, that they may be held back by the rest of the group, that the group can be used to further 
social relations, to the detriment of (policy) economic objectives, and finally that credit demand can 
be influenced by the need to offset future expenditures. These four scenarios all demonstrate how 
the construction of borrowing groups, actually detracts considerably from the notion of equally able 
individuals coming together to fulfil common objectives.  
Loan group construction moreover reproduces existing social community strengths, as 
individuals mobilise their social and economic capital to fulfil group formation and application 
demands. The repercussion of this is that it is only the individuals with the ability and the potential 
to capitalise on existing resources, and overcome constraining forces, that end up being members in 
loan groups. But, as has been observed, social strength cannot be equated with an ability or an 
incentive to increase income. The loan group can also be utilised to enhance social capital, to the 
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detriment of economic accumulation. This is influenced by individuals not possessing the capacity 
to overcome negative forces, while social investment provides more community security than 
embarking on uncertain market activities. Here applications and group animation also neglect that 
existing capacity can be insufficient to meet repayment demands, and additionally, that embedded 
social capital takes the form it does, due to these broader constraints. It further overlooks that credit 
demand may well be a symptom of these weaknesses, and that neither credit, nor further investment 
in existing social capital, will be able to overcome these.  
In an empowerment perspective it is also relevant that communities are not permitted 
to define for themselves their priority needs, nor question the conditions under which they are 
rewarded access to credit. The procedures designed to prove would-be members worth (by their 
having to pay regularly into a common pool prior to group membership), leads to social relations 
being employed to satisfy this demand. This lessons project risk, but can lead to individuals having 
to use credit (to purchase material goods), to reinvest in the social relations their membership relies 
upon. Investment in kind can also increase vulnerability, as borrowers economic success relies on 
unpredictable market developments. Here the switching from investment in livestock (an embedded 
practice designed to lesson lean season hardship) to the purchases of considerable amounts of rice 
and shea, amounts to placing the future economic status of the household, at the mercy of 
exogenous market forces. In this context it has been shown that for some members this means that 
their economic vulnerability prior to disbursement may well have increased as a result of taking the 
loan. This is complicated as well by members relying on non-economic strengths in order to satisfy 
application demands and further, group membership being influenced by a need to cover losses on 
spouses farms.  
Overall it has also been shown that in the problematic groups, older women with 
relatively strong social networks are the ones who form groups while younger women, often more 
adaptable, are disinclined for a number of reasons, though these would arguably benefit more from 
loans. In the next chapter the limits of group construction are recognised further, by concentrating 
more on the period after disbursement. Of particular concern is how group reproduction is affected 
by individual characteristics and existing socio-economic organisation.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PROGRAMME / COMMUNITY INTERACTIONS AFTER DISBURSEMENT 
This chapter concentrates more on how collection designs influence existing savings, 
spending and investment habits. After the three month grace period, repayments commence in the 
form of prearranged group meetings, where the loan officer calls the members one at a time and 
monies are handed over and savings and credit books corrected accordingly. At meetings that had 
been called for problematic groups, it was clear, that members had little idea of each others payment 
status or whether some were in default.87 For the problem groups, endeavours to increase income 
did not consequently appear to stem from group co-operation or participation as a whole, nor did 
selling, buying or payment issues, seem to have been discussed on a group basis beforehand. These 
observations from group meetings became strengthened when talking to members individually. The 
relatively high degree of economic individualism was influenced by their personal aspirations, their 
history of only 4-5 individuals working together,  and the fact that many often competed in the same 
markets. These observations are now given detail in the following cases, which relate these factors 
to collective responsibility and disciplinary action due to default.  
GROUP AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS ON INDIVIDUAL AMBITIONS 
 
Case 5. Azima (group D) is an experienced shea butter processor currently paying off her second loan term. She 
explains how the loan has resulted in her income doubling and happily describes herself as ‘very busy.’ Things have 
improved greatly since last year, when there was 'nothing in the hand.'  She sets aside a percentage of even the smallest 
sales each day so that there is ample when payment is due, and additionally has enough to give 'small support' to a 
blind, elderly sister. Her husband’s maize crop, just harvested, has also been good this season. She explains that the 
main obstacles to further success are transport to market and customers demanding credit. This means she has to choose 
and balance between selling much smaller amounts locally, but more easily, at a higher price, or alternatively, to travel 
to other markets, where competition can be fierce and prices are lower, though sales are almost guaranteed. In non-local 
markets, she explains that together with other sellers an absolute minimum price is often agreed, but this is still higher 
than that of quality factory produced oils which are widely available. Weekly and sometimes twice weekly group 
meetings also cause annoyance, as they  deprive her of the opportunity of travelling to Tamale, where it can often be 
necessary to stay one or two nights. She says the Magazia's permission is needed to miss a meeting, which is not always 
forthcoming. She also says its a problem that many in the group are pursuing the same activities and markets, and 
further, that she can't withdraw the downpayment she made on joining the group, in order to purchase more shea nuts 
for processing. Asking for a bigger loan, she says that 'a frequent beating kills the snake,'  meaning that for her to 
continue success, its vital that she keeps going continually.       
 
The above account exemplifies how an individual’s success has been limited by group 
unity, transport and market access. Similar to the previous cases on rice processors, it also reveals 
how market uncertainties are reproduced, as more sellers enter the same markets, and compete over 
                                                 
87 It was generally the Magazia who retained the payment booklets who gave these to the loan officer on arrival. As the 
loan officer read out the names of each member, and told how much each had due, the rest of the group would often 
either applaud or criticise the individual concerned.  
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a limited customer base. Here the terms of a buyers’ market actually improve, as customers’ 
demands for credit become difficult to avoid, forcing prices down further. For this individual, being 
bound to group unity allowed access to badly needed funding, but was detrimental to her expansion 
endeavours.88 In sum there were limitations placed on her ambitions, between the need to overcome 
group practices, and the requirement to support the group activities, made the more difficult by in-
group competition and the need to participate to secure credit access.  
SOURCES OF GROUP FISSION  
Case 6. Meili (group A) is about 70 years old and lives with her aged husband in a compound a good 15 
minutes walk from the village where the rest of the group live. She appears thin but strong, and is ignoring what looks 
like three broken fingers on her right hand. She is carrying one of her many grandchildren on her back while she talks to 
us. She joined the group and took the loan for the first time three years ago after a long period, where six of her seven 
children grew up and moved away. Her group has at least 4 members who are in default, and up to 5 months in arrears.  
She feels isolated from other members and is trying on her own to make up her own arrears, which amount to a single 
monthly repayment. She says she was forced to spend this money on food, which provided a much needed supplement. 
Initially her problems started due to shea processing the previous season not giving as much as expected. Currently 
(February) shea is still scarce and prices are high, as the real harvest hasn’t started yet, and is still 2-3 months away. 
This explains why it is difficult to raise the repayment she owes, and why she avoids the group meetings where 
arguments are common.   
 
Case 7. Sanaatu (group A) lives in the same compound as Meili, and is in the same loan group. She switches 
between rice and shea processing depending on the time of year. Like Meili she also experienced problems processing 
shea last year, which has resulted in her now being about seven months in arrears, having paid only two out of the nine 
repayments required. She emphasises that her difficulties stemmed mainly on her concentrating on keeping five of her 
seven children in school. Although she succeeded in this, her position was made the more difficult by her mother falling 
ill and a recent death in the family. These factors together meant that after the last harvest she never ‘really got going,’ 
and didn’t make the necessary investments in either rice or shea last year. This in turn meant that a good portion of the 
loan money was spent on food and consumption, instead of this being covered by profit. She explains that she currently 
has a single bag of maize stocked, and is waiting for the price to rise as the lean season kicks in. She stresses that it is 
better for her to save this and sell later, despite not conforming to repayment procedures, because last year maize 
climbed from 3 to 12,000 cedis a bowl from January to May.89  
 
These accounts illustrate how household characteristics can easily and inadvertently 
lead to group cohesion being threatened, as the best option for both is to go against loan conditions, 
delay payment, and bank on seasonal price improvements during the lean season.90 Meili clearly 
had little help from other members, and as well as being aged and physically isolated from the rest 
of the community, she was not in the position to draw on social networks to help with payment. The 
fact that other members of this group were in a much worse position than she was, also explained 
                                                 
88 A problem heard frequently by shea processors was the gamble of going to far off markets where higher costs could 
be experienced due to spillage, calabashes (for storage) breaking, or heat spoiling the finished butter. As such there was 
only a small time interval allowed for optimal gains, between processing the butter and actual sale. None of the 
informants had access to refrigeration. 
89 A bag of maize is about 40kg and gives around 60 bowls.   
90 This can either mean waiting for the harvest, or waiting for prices to rise right up to harvest time through the lean 
season. 
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why she thought it best not to get involved with group problems, as she had initially renewed the 
loan in order to offset her own household difficulties. These though had not been overcome, and 
cumulative negative effects continued as a result of collective responsibility. This was also because 
when the shea harvest does start and prices fall, she will not have the adequate funds to invest 
enough in stock, and subsequently profits will be lower than required.  
At the same time, because of hers and others default, their loan will most probably not 
be renewed at the critical time of being disbursed to coincide with the onset of the shea harvest. 
This again means that she and the rest of the group will have very limited monies to invest into shea 
to realise gains, by purchasing while prices are low. In the case of Sanaatu, the same exogenous 
factors present similar problems, though household characteristics mean that they persist under a 
different form, as she had the advantage of sitting on stock, that could raise as many as three of her 
seven repayment arrears. The fate of both cases are thereby ultimately conditioned by factors the 
individual borrowers themselves have little influence over and credit is unable to relieve, but by 
themselves lead to credit demand. Most significant as well is how credit provision quite easily 
becomes inseparable from the day to day costs of providing for the household, and cannot 
realistically be understood as being in women’s ultimate control. Here it also appears that group 
membership had increased the burden of borrowers household economic responsibilities, as a new 
source of income entered the domestic realm.91  
‘LEGITIMATE’ DEFAULT 
Informants admitted that permission could be given to an individual group member to 
default ‘legitimately,’ provided they could assure other members that the missing instalment could 
be covered later, which showed how the demands of regular payment often didn’t fit with the credit 
based market characteristics.92  The essence of this strategy was that borrowers utilised the notion of 
group participation and cohesion, to rework the terms of credit, to mutual and longer term 
advantage, due to an individual’s immediate inability to pay. Here, empowerment in practice meant 
that the group outplayed the institutional set-up they themselves were a product of.93 Social capital 
then became mobilised, which actually increased significantly Simli Pong’s collection costs, which 
was based on circumstances largely beyond borrowers own control. Though in practice default was 
                                                 
91 There was consensus that saving in kind was preferred to cash, which ’just disappeared’ and/or had to be hidden from 
husbands or was diverted to family. Savings in kind made seasonal sense and was more easily controlled.  
92 This occurred both with and without Simli Pong’s accept or knowledge. 
93 At an extraordinary collection meeting called by the loans supervisor, members heckled each other in a half serious, 
half humorous manner when their default status was read aloud. The commotion was also designed to consolidate the 
group socially and cover up their poor economic record.  
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a sign of the group working together successfully. Examples of ’legitimate’ default were witnessed 
in all the six groups covered, and was employed to compensate the following reasons for default.94   
a. Extra costs arising from unforeseen household circumstances and especially household 
calamities.95   
b. Coverage of husband’s losses resulting in insufficient investment in stock while prices were 
low, thereby limiting from the outset market participation.  
c. The loan being late in disbursement. Here also, non-payment stemmed from an inability to 
enter the market at harvest time, hence lessening the chance of future gains.  
d. One or more members of a loan group failing, followed by others endeavouring to retain 
their own loan as long as possible.96   
e.  Profit not materialising due to markets being glutted, because of either  imports and/or a 
bumper harvest.  
The following now details more the strategies connected to the stalling of payment, existing 
socio-economic organisation, and relations with the credit programme itself.  
INDIVIDUAL / GROUP ECONOMIC RENEGOTIATIONS OF LOAN TERMS 
For individuals who wished to renew loans the next year, non-payment or stalling 
aimed to push the boundaries of what Simli Pong permitted as far as possible, before sanctions were 
imposed. Hanging on to the money as long as possible allowed consumption costs to be covered, 
where it was not possible to accrue much help from others. For groups in difficulties, there was also 
evidence that some individuals saw little incentive in presenting a number of consecutive, timely 
and prompt repayments, if others could not pay. For individuals meanwhile who were not interested 
in renewing the loan, stretching the repayment period out as long as possible also, in effect, made it 
cheaper.97  
Considering the volatile and often unpredictable nature of the shea, rice and ground 
nut markets, it also became clear that the project promotion of saving and paying in a symbolic 
amount each month (between 5-10,000 cedis) was not always beneficial. After having been 
committed to repay the loan with a high interest rate, it was clearly more beneficial for borrowers 
experiencing problems to hang on to all monies, (mostly exchanged to kind) as long as possible, 
                                                 
94 In all these cases difficulties increased for borrowers as they also used parts of the loan for food expenses.  
95 General fatigue for example was common, as was occasional poor health of children or older dependants, and family 
deaths.  
96 One informant replied that ’I can’t rely afford to pay right now, if she doesn’t pay than I’m not going to either.' 
97 Once again there were many different relations observed, conditioned by the level and extent of common group 
objectives, disparities prevalent between individual borrowers themselves, their social and economic capital, and finally 
how favourable their market and transport conditions were.  
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which also meant not contributing to the savings account. In this sense delaying payment was itself 
a savings strategy. Instead of repayment and saving being complementary and positive 
developments, as the programme assumed, both repayment and savings initiatives during the lean 
season undermined community coping strategies based on investment in livestock and grain.98  
Conversely, groups and individuals whose location allowed better market access and 
enjoyed more reliable transport, gained benefits of regular payment, as this built up credibility with 
staff, who ensured their future loan disbursements arrived on time for harvests.  
SUBJUGATION OF ECONOMIC REALTIONS TO EMBEDDED SOCIAL PRACTICE   
Moving away now from economic issues connected to the stalling of payments, the 
following now exemplifies how groups’ inability to increase income led to attempts at increasing 
the symbolic value of the relationship between them and Simli Pong.99 Here, borrowers hoped to 
use their social unity, to raise the social premium placed on their economic obligation to Simli 
Pong.  
This was manifested in the loan officer demanding the groups’ outstanding payments, 
followed by the members responding that payment would leave them not only penniless, but much 
more vulnerable, as they would not be able to cover basic household costs. This was an attempt to 
bring social responsibility into the economic exchange, while staff had to balance between 
demanding payment to satisfy collection targets, and also being aware that repayment would 
weaken the borrowers’ future chances of positive returns. Groups experiencing problems clearly 
had an objective in renegotiating loan conditions, and endeavoured, to establish social contacts with 
staff to buy time. This was in accordance with borrowers’ embedded socio-economic dispositions, 
that placed less emphasis on the actual economic exchange, and more on the social contact and 
mutual help invested during the intervals between exchanges.100 This attempt to exchange economic 
relations to a social responsibility however, stems less from the incompatibility of the two realms, 
as Hyden otherwise suggests, and much more from individuals and groups being unable to 
manoeuvre successfully within exogenous and endogenous constraints in order to accrue economic 
                                                 
98 At several collection meetings argument ensued as the loans supervisor complained that defaulters did not pay up, 
despite owning stock, while borrowers were awaiting price increases. Disinterest in cash savings was also 
understandable, considering that potential increases from investment in kind were far greater than paying into a saving 
account, where access was difficult, no interest was paid, and the amount was open to depreciation from inflation. (15% 
in Jan 2006) 
99 This was observed at a collection meeting where members opinionated quite openly, that they genuinely thought the 
loan was a gift which didn’t need to be repaid. This was despite it being very obvious to all parties (including them), 
that it was a loan and repayment conditions applied, which they had also understood, agreed to  and signed on. 
100 In support of this, loan officers often visited problem groups more often, and social contact developed together with 
them returning to communities frequently to collect outstanding payments.   
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gains from credit. Here social renegotiations are subsequently not the cause of economic 
underdevelopment but a symptom of economic vulnerability. Attempts at social investment were 
observed through all informants emphasising their ‘gratitude,’ indebtedness,’ and their being very 
happy with their relations with the project, despite being unable to fulfil loan conditions.  
In a broader perspective the social development of relations, between staff and 
problematic groups, demonstrates how borrowers attempt to capitalise on their non-economic 
strengths due to the limitations regarding the forwarding of economic ambitions. As the default 
period lengthens moreover, social visits by staff undermined the rigid and officialised nature of  
collection procedures, with fixed and regular payments. Here stalling aimed to abolish these project 
designs.  
Problem groups aspired to reconstruct the working of the loan system, to fit their own 
dispositions, which in turn made them more able and willing to serve the workings of the group as a 
potential source of social power. As with embedded traditions of gift giving or contributions at 
either social occasions or in hard times, the social contract and help between exchanges was more 
vital than the exchange itself. This was because the whole idea of embedded community help was to 
ease seasonal hardship, and offer what services one could provide at that particular time. The 
inability to pay, similarly went hand in hand with offering social contact as some form of 
compensation or substitute. This was witnessed at collection meetings with the groups, which often 
became, deliberately, very drawn out affairs, and could take up most of the morning or afternoon. It 
was not uncommon to wait perhaps over two hours for a borrower to appear from her house, while 
the rest pretended not to know where they were. At the same time, conversation developed and the 
problem groups also presented themselves as a social unit, with all wearing colourful clothes, and in 
effect made the collection meeting a social event. This reproduced however the embedded gendered 
dispositions, which ultimately were conditioned by uncertainty surrounding the groups’ inability to 
take hold of economic aspirations, and group meetings were a manifestation of development 
occurring on premises outside of the groups control.101   
So, the purpose of making efforts to initiate social relations, was based primarily on 
constraining forces. As a result of delayed payment and more frequent meetings, groups however 
made it more difficult for loan officers to continue to objectify the group as loan procedures 
otherwise demanded. The (attempts) at developing social contacts with staff, in sum, aimed at 
                                                 
101 This also took advantage of staff travelling perhaps 2 hours on a motorbike along the merest of tracks to get to 
communities. Simli Pong attempted in turn to avoid this strategy developing, by rotating staff between communities, 
and giving senior staff the responsibility of problem groups.   
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raising an awareness that group activities were a result of complex influences, which could not 
always abide by the programme demands and procedures. As explained in chapter four, this could 
also lead to staff recording a payment as satisfactory, which gave the borrower a lengthened 
breathing space and staff a good collection figure.  
The conflictual field between borrowers and programme staff, consisted then of both 
parts attempting to reproduce as much as possible the structures and institutions of which they were  
a product. For subsistence communities this meant capitalising on existing social strength and 
indeed using the loan group to further this. This involved endeavouring to exchange the strictly 
economic relation to a social commitment, which anyway was a policy objective. For staff it meant 
fulfilling their dispositions heavily influenced by the success indicators concerning portfolio 
expansion, and maintaining high collection rates, which required objectifying the group in ways that 
developing social contacts aimed to undermine. In total, this resulted in the project developing a 
norm that they were not really concerned where the money for payment came from as long as it was 
paid on time.102 In this way, a compromise was reached between self-sustainability and social 
empowerment, though, in agreement with Mayoux, it was far from certain whether income growth 
and poverty reduction was occurring. Having observed how the inability to repay can forward group 
unity and endeavours to renegotiate loan conditions, the following now recognises how this social 
unity becomes threatened as a result of default and disciplinary action.    
INDIVIDUAL / GROUP TENSIONS FOLLOWING DEFAULT 
This section concentrates on one particular group, who were in major difficulties and 
awaiting both customary and formal legal sanctions, as at least six members were in serious arrears, 
while others had completely finished with payments. As the project endeavoured to solve 
repayment problems through collective responsibility, the chances of success for non-defaulting 
members also became endangered, as others’ default carried the very real risk of economic 
problems continuing into the following season due to administered sanction procedures. 
What is shown here is that all three programme objectives become compromised, as 
the default period elapses, though little real effort is made into solving the causes of payment 
difficulties.   
Case 8.  Rukaya (group A) is around 70 years and a member of a 'multi-purpose group' in its third term, where 
one of her daughters is the Magazia. She acknowledges the difficulties but will not commit herself to any explanations. 
Rukaya's main income source is from making millet porridge every other day, which she sells from her house regularly 
                                                 
102 This is reflected in the 2005 Baseline Report which gives 95% of borrowers having the ability to repay their loan, 
though it doesn’t detail where monies stemmed from, stating only that this figure; ’implies well for the sustainability of 
the GDCP loan scheme.’ P.41. 
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and successfully. She also says she gets ample help from her children and grandchildren, explaining that for the 
defaulters, their shortage of money is made the more difficult, by it being very embarrassing for women to ask others 
for financial help, as it reveals ones own inability to get family help.  
 
Case 9.  Naama, is in the same group,  (group A) and from several meeting with her, it was obvious she was 
being socially ostracised by other members. 103 Asked about how she came to be some 7 months in default, she explains 
that her husband had to have a serious and expensive operation about 6 months previously, which coincided roughly 
with the last monthly payment on the loan. The cost of this took all her and her husbands savings, and necessitated 
additionally a substantial loan from various family members and friends, of which she says about half has now been 
repaid. She explains further that Simli Pong were not informed about the medical bill until after the repayment was 
overdue. She says that she has a quantity of beans to sell, but currently the prices are still low (about half of what they 
could rise to in 3-4 months). Now she is attempting to stall repayment as long as possible, in order to maximise profit 
and pay off as much as possible. She is also fearful that Simli Pong will act on the threat with either police action or 
taking her to the chief, which would be a very shameful experience, and make her look bad in the village 'as the most 
poor and unreliable member.'  The issue is further confounded by the fact that the Magazia is her husbands sister, and 
her brother’s wife is also in the group. This she says means that some members are 'with her' in that they accept the 
default was not her fault, and are willing to use the group savings to clear the debt, after which she can repay them. 
Most of the group however think that the amount due is too much and too 'personal' for the groups funds to cover her 
costs. Straining the group further, is the fact that the Magazia also lost her husband from a long sickness around the 
same time Naama’s husband was taken ill. This divided the group, as argument grew over how far the understanding of 
collective responsibility should cover personal losses.  
 
Case 10.  Alima is the secretary of this group and is understandably angry that developments have split the group 
and importantly have began to jeopardise her own economic activities.104 She complains that holding the group 
together, and fulfilling Simli Pong demands, is becoming increasingly difficult, due mainly to her inability to influence 
the negative circumstances. She says the arrangement of extra meetings to solve problems has become almost 
impossible, and these also interfere with her business plans. She regrets deeply that the bad payers are holding back the 
success of others, and 'feels pinched between members and Simli Pong' which she has high regards for, and has had a 
long contact with. Not wanting to go into detail, Alima complains that; 'people won't pay, even just after harvest,' and 
emphasises that, 'things went bad because some didn't follow the rules.’  
 
These cases show how households’ irregular and unreliable income flows, and 
personal calamities, are beyond the capacity of being solved through the group, while collective 
responsibility hold back the whole group from loan renewal, while it is reasoned that this is still the 
best way of increasing pressure on the defaulting individuals. The threat of being ‘taken to the chief 
to sort things out,’ led additionally to Naama being ostracised, which made it more difficult for her 
to initiate help for economic activities. Imposing sanctions against her personally also built on the 
assumption that she really had a choice between paying her husband’s medical expenses or repaying 
the loan, which in practice she obviously did not have. Disciplinary action thereby assumed that her 
non-payment could have been avoided, and was her own fault. This was reflected in interviews with 
senior staff who continually reinforced the understanding that debt was almost always based on 
                                                 
103 At a group meeting where only 6 out of 20 members turned up, she was ignored completely and sat on her own. On a 
subsequent meeting, when we asked for her, the secretary pretended she didn’t know where she was, didn’t mention her 
by name, ask anyone else, nor show us direction to her house. 
104 Alima explains that she travels to Kumasi (about 5 hours on a bus), 3-4 times a year and purchases around 100 pairs 
of plastic flip-flops, which she sells at Muslim festivals in Tamale. She says that at this time, around the new year, is the 
best time of all and she was consequently in need of accruing funds to finance purchases at this time.  
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ineptitude and/or laziness and that; ‘borrowers can  always do better.'105 Group reproduction then 
becomes more and more of a disadvantage to both the group, individuals and the project, as both 
individual sanctions and collective punishment actuate fission, away from group unity.106 There was 
additionally widespread anecdotal evidence from informants, that repayment problems could arise 
from the loan being disbursed late in relation to the start of harvests. This was because prices would 
already be on the rise when the loan arrives, which subsequently lessened profit margins from 
stock.107   
THE LIMITS OF CREDIT ALLOCATION  
Building on the above cases, a number of scenarios are now outlined which recognise 
in more general terms how existing socio-economic organisation is affected by credit allocation 
measures. For simplicity, as a starting point all groups are understood as receiving a first loan to 
coincide with either the rice, ground nut or shea harvests, investments in stock have been made, and 
the first repayments commence as arranged.   
Scenario 1. Individual’s start to process products and sell when prices start to rise. This raises some 
profit and it is possible to repay the loan on time, as the increase in product prices easily 
compensate for the monthly repayments and interest on the loan. 
Scenario 2. When the first repayment is due, prices haven't risen sufficiently, due perhaps to a 
bumper harvest or cheap imports. The first choice here is to sell some stock to make the due 
repayment, but the longer prices don’t rise, the more the initial investment in produce becomes 
weakened as a source of future gains. A second choice in the case of unsubstantial price increases, 
is to borrow the cost of the monthly instalments to such a time when prices are favourable. This 
means that the stock is still secure to maximise gains off expected future price increases, but this 
action would depend on the borrowers ability to draw off social relations, and further, on how other 
endogenous factors weigh for or against borrowing for repayment. In both choices however the 
repayment would be made on time.  
Scenario 3. Unsubstantial price rises result in repayment being stalled, due to an inability to draw  
economic support and/or the disinclination to sell stock early. Firstly, this entails saving stock  
                                                 
105 It was never openly accepted that group reproduction, or the numerous other constraints could lead to payment 
problems, as it was assumed the socially strong women could always rely on friends and relatives to help with 
instalments. 
106 All practices centred on recovering monies involve forms of disciplinary action or punishment. This  could involve 
using individual’s savings or group savings to cover the default, any confiscation of materials (f.eks. ploughs), a 
summons to the local chief, a rescheduling of the loan, a raising of the interest rate or formal legal action. 
107 It was not possible to find definitive evidence of this relationship from the statistics available, though disbursement 
dates for entering markets could swing up to 7 or so weeks. Ceteris paribus, a late start in market participation could 
have a considerable effect on households subsequent profit margins.  
 58
bought cheaply, in the hope that prices will go up at a later point in time. The success of this 
however depends on the individual’s social relations with the rest of the group. The dilemma here is 
that this could well be the best option, provided prices rise, but it could also entail the worst 
outcome both for the individual and for the group if prices stay low.  
In order that the whole group can pull through then, all these factors have to have 
positive outcomes, not least the reproduction of the group itself, which as recognised, often 
introduces a number of additional problems to individual’s economic endeavours.  
CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS FOR FUTURE SUCCESS 
As the objective of promoting economic responsibility, through group unity, requires 
any negative endogenous factors being denied, the delaying of a loan renewal, which all forms of 
disciplinary action involve, make the chances of group income increases all the more difficult. The 
dilemma here is that group reproduction, designed to keep transaction costs low, often accentuate in 
cases of default the social tensions which arise from constructing unity, participation and co-
operation. But group unity often cannot solve repayment issues, especially if most of the group are 
experiencing economic hardship anyway. Delaying the disbursement of a second or third loan was 
commonplace.108 Disciplinary sanctions then inadvertently undermined further the ability of the 
group to satisfy their side of the loan agreement, and groups are presented with more of an uphill 
struggle by the time the new loan is disbursed. Sanction practices further have the potential of 
causing negative knock-on effects on newly formed groups, because their disbursement is 
conditioned by sufficient funding being available after being collected from other groups. 
Customary sanctions also reproduced women's subordinate status, as a summons left them in no 
doubt that through their default, they were offending established, patriarchal, chiefly authority. This 
also illustrates how disciplinary actions reinforced symbolic power relations in the patriarchal 
society, but rarely addressed how economic action, for example access to resources and funding 
was conditioned by these very structures.109     
SUMMARY 
Households experiencing problems often have to balance between conflicting 
strategies. Selling produce purchased for loan money at an earlier date than is otherwise profitable 
                                                 
108 In one example Simli Pong stalled the decision whether to renew the loan or not for three months, reflected a split 
between on the one hand having to enforce some kind of punishment for previous breaches, while on the other wanting 
to continue to provide economic aid. There was also a common held view that late disbursement would make the group 
work harder the following season.  
109 All disciplinary action excluding evidence of serious illness or death focused strictly on the economics of the 
problem. The many other interrelated factors which caused poverty initially, besides lack of capital, were not 
approached.  
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in order to keep up repayments, or delaying payment in the hope that future price increases will be 
able to cover several months loan instalments. Non-repayment can similarly result from households 
judging that temporary default, despite the threat of sanctions, is often better than selling produce at 
a lower price then can be had in a month or two. Non-repayment can also result from the loan 
money being used for purposes other than stock investment, such as covering spouses farm losses, 
previous failures, or being used for essential consumption costs. The act of non-payment however 
may demand in-group negotiation, and depend on the social status of the temporary defaulter. As 
the successful utilisation of the loan requires favourable endogenous factors, and a reasonably 
strong initial starting point, the social status of individual borrowers becomes more and more 
important, as the season develops and times get harder. Because the ability to overcome repayment 
problems rests on both intra and extra group contacts, defaulters are often the individuals who 
appear as the most isolated, both  in physical, social and economic contexts.  
In total it is been recognised that the social capital required for group membership 
does not translate to economic aid between members to help with repayments. This is due to market 
competition within the group, and individuals coping with their own problems. Significantly, this is 
also due to vulnerable groups being more of a social rather than an economic construction, and not 
having the ability to overcome constraining forces, which successful utilisation of credit requires. 
Disparate endogenous factors, which condition whether payment is made or not, can act to pull 
problem groups apart,  while group fission is constrained by the reproduction of group construction 
and collective responsibility.  
Delaying payment can also be an attempt to renegotiate loan conditions with staff, and 
push the boundaries of what is permissible, in order to secure maximum benefit from credit 
allocation.  This leads to tensions, as successful members and staff endeavour to reproduce the 
group an economic project, while defaulters rely on their social recourses, and aspire to build upon 
this due to their inability to repay. Hidden transcripts come to the surface as staff concentrate on 
collection and ignore where the monies come from ‘so long as the repayment is made.’ For 
vulnerable groups, the fixed system of payments, demanded by self-sustainability, is not compatible 
with solving the initial factors that drove individuals demand for credit in the first place, the most 
significant of which is very irregular and uncertain income. Here it is also significant that credit 
enables a larger number of people to participate in already strained domestic markets, where 
processors are many and customers few. Increased competition amongst processors can causes 
group fission, push prices down (which agreed minimum prices try to compensate for), and leads 
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further to their customers being able to demand credit on favourable terms. In total there was 
significant circumstantial evidence, that vulnerability increased due to borrowers increased market 
activity, requiring the taking of risks to secure funding for repayments. This is additionally because 
considerable investment has to be made in rice and/or nut stocks at the start of the harvest, which 
influences unavailability and relies on price hikes for profit. In short, success from credit involves 
borrowers investing in and reproducing market instabilities. Individual characteristics vary 
considerably, to such an extent that reproducing group unity can be more of a disadvantage than an 
asset. Policy design denies this, and reinforces only group unity as the solution to payment 
problems, based on the understanding that this will keep collection low. Intra-group disparities 
concerning repayment can at one extreme reflect a genuine weakness of group planning, co-
ordination and  co-operation, but more so, demonstrates different levels of social and economic 
capital and household capabilities. Here, a relatively common event (illness or death) can mean that 
the whole group falls behind en masse, due to collective responsibility and limited individual 
capacity. In practice, neither the group executive not members are in the position to tackle the 
effects of a misfortunate or lazy member.  
Moving on now to how policy can affect these groups, it has been shown that 
individuals’ and groups’ ability to utilise credit successfully and capitalise on a loan, can be 
influenced greatly by the procedures implemented by the project itself. In these contexts, it has been 
shown that practices can actually add to the problems groups are already experiencing, as a late 
disbursement following disciplinary action means as well a late arrival onto markets.  
The cases discussed here also show the limits of communities’ economies of affection, 
in that they cannot be mobilised to provide group payments as an economic unit, as members utilise 
their disparate social capital to renegotiate loan terms. In agreement with Mayoux, the fulfilment of 
the policy objectives, concerning individual success (increased income and decision making), can 
be contrary to the reproduction of group cohesion itself, required by self sustainability. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
-Self sustainability 
It has been recognised that the GDCP/Simli Pong micro credit programme is centred 
on fulfilling financial sustainability, reducing poverty and increasing the ability of borrowing 
women, to participate in community development, and fulfil their economic aspirations. Here it has 
been found that the first objective is the most predominant concern, and that the fulfilment of the 
other two objectives, is assumed to have succeeded on the basis of a logical framework approach. 
This is supported by indicators focusing mainly on portfolio growth and high repayment statistics. 
In sum, the fulfilment of the self-sustainability paradigm, enabled through rigorous collection 
practices, legitimises the employed indicators, which thereafter equate repayment with women’s 
empowerment and poverty reduction having been accomplished. Self sustainability demands 
consequently a simplification of community characteristics, most notably the construction of a 
specific women's economic domain, which rests on an assumption that household arenas, that 
receive credit, have similar starting positions, equal opportunities and common objectives. Project 
staff are aware that there is no automatic nor obvious link, between the indicators, (increased) 
income, and any improvements, understood in terms of enhancing borrowers ability to make 
independent decision. This has been exemplified by the disregard of where repayment monies 
actually stem from.  
Policy design and implementation practices thereby deny the extent to which 
endogenous factors actually influence borrowers ability to fulfil the loan conditions. This becomes 
sidelined, due to the construction and reproduction of group responsibility, while household 
differences mean that the loan group does not possess the capacity to solve the issues, which lead to 
individual members problems (this is also beyond the limits of what individual and group training, 
based on ‘capacity building’ can solve). In short, credit demand is a symptom and a manifestation 
of structural instability and market vulnerability, which group reproduction does not provide the 
means for members to overcome. The provision of loans for socially and economically weak 
individuals however, satisfies the project objective of enabling social, community unity. Collective 
responsibility can further complicate individual household’s difficulties. This is because, firstly, 
successful members (in the same group) cannot renew their loans until all have paid, secondly, 
disciplinary action can lead to defaulters being ostracised, making their success all the more 
difficult, and thirdly, sanctions can entice members to dissolve the group, as they feel it unfair to 
cover other members failures. Collective economic responsibility threatens this social unity, 
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because it rests on an understanding that within the group, social capital can be exchanged for 
economic capital. This is often not the case, especially concerning members from different families, 
because firstly, (as shown in chapter 6), groups are formed to further existing, mainly non-economic 
relations within the community, and secondly, borrowers join groups in the economic sense to 
realise mainly individual or household based ambitions.  
  Self-sustainability objectives also mean that communities have to be constructed and 
reproduced in both traditional and non-traditional forms. On the one hand this allows older women 
to further embedded social control over communities, but also means that economically more 
resourceful younger women were excluded. This is due to these being less able to get husband’s 
permission to join, being in a less favourable position to secure family help for self selection 
payments, and finally because they are unwilling to be under the control of aged relatives. 
-Empowerment factors 
Project empowerment aspirations are conditioned by a number of interrelated factors. 
Group success in this sense, as a whole, depends on all households being able to strike the correct 
balance between asset preservation for future gains, and immediate income generation for 
instalments. Succeeders in groups with repayment problems, also have to weigh the social and 
economic risks involved in helping a defaulter with an instalment, and as well calculate whether 
their own household can afford this. They further have to judge whether it is worth staying in the 
group, and increasing their level of economic autonomy, and whether membership is beneficial 
enough for them, to continue to work within the group, to perhaps secure a second or third loan.  
Further, both success and failure are closely related to borrower’s spouses economic 
capital, the number of dependants borrowers have to look after, the number of children they have 
and the age of these, the borrowers own age, their health situation, and finally the extent to which 
borrowers have social support from relatives and friends. It is the result of this complex matrix, 
which dictates how credit monies are utilised, and whether group construction can be translated into 
the fulfilment of policy assumptions. That this cannot very often be realised, was illustrated by the 
fact that most groups do not last for more than four or so loan terms. Loan default and especially 
delay in repayment, reflected attempts to balance between these demands, to maintain current 
household consumption levels, and to work within and influence the economic and social norms 
that could constrain or present favourable opportunities.  
In this sense borrowers empowerment dispositions concentrate more on symbolic 
profit, while economic exchanges between members can jeopardise the pursuit of this. This was 
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shown through observations that social obligations which involved economic exchanges, were kept 
separate from economic exchanges to fulfil instalment demands. The practice of lending between 
borrowers for repayment was never admitted openly, as it was the antithesis of the social capital 
which the group was founded upon. The consequence of this (in practice) was that the economic 
failure of one or two individuals, could easily jeopardise the group as a whole, due to all payments 
having to be made before a new loan was forthcoming. That a group could run aground on the basis 
of a relatively insignificant amount, indicates additionally that the individual members social 
integrity was more important, and of more real value, than the group as a whole contributing to the 
loan arrears. Due to household’s disparate capabilities and ambition levels, default consequently 
often was accompanied by bitter argument over how arrears should best be covered, as collective 
punishment had unequal effects on the different members.  
Women’s investment in social capital within the group, and the general pursuit of 
individual and household based economic objectives, was also conditioned by husband’s failures 
having to be covered first, where small profits led to women taking more responsibility for social 
ceremony costs, and generally that the loan increased the indispensability of their household 
contribution. Here, it is debatable whether these increases in women’s household responsibilities are 
equatable with the projects empowerment understandings, based on improving decision making 
capabilities. Besides this being a problematic concept to quantify (though taken for granted), 
increases in individuals’ decision making capability was hampered by group construction itself, as 
any problems within the group meant that members somehow were called upon to take 
responsibility, for issues that were largely outside their control. Namely, trying to get neighbours to 
work harder or control their spending habits. Mostly, this was simply not possible, and group 
members could generally not dictate to others members what to do, especially because all 
households had their own difficulties to deal with, while others perhaps might be experiencing 
something better or worse. Here though, the most visible manifestation of social capital in the 
borrowing groups, was the relatively old age of all members, which indicated how existing social 
strength became reproduced through loan provision. This reflected policy contradictions, between 
the targeting of older women, which at least initially kept transaction costs low, and which fulfilled 
the objective of reaching the most vulnerable of individuals, and the objective of reducing poverty, 
which would have meant the targeting of younger, more active and innovative women and men.  
Targeting older women was assumed to be a safer option for the project. Rather than 
concentrating specifically on fulfilling community economic accumulation, older women were 
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more preferable as many of these enjoyed family support for instalments and their presence in the 
village made them easier to locate. In this way older women's thankfulness for the loan was based 
on it allowing the reproduction of their symbolic power, both over the family and over younger 
women, who were noticeably absent from most of the groups interviewed. Aged members also used 
the social construction of the group to maintain control over traditional activities, and to a certain 
extent to co-ordinate group activities, which could enhance or at least protect their social standing in 
the community. In both cases though, the reproduction of (older) female community power 
relations, also reinforced males ultimate control over women’s access to resources, because the 
development of economic relations remained subordinate to existing structures. This is because 
older women’s relatively low level of economic activity posed little threat to the male domain, and 
accumulation was anyway restricted by market conditions, poor transport and traditional processing 
activities themselves. The significance of older women’s social strength was also clear from 
examining how disciplinary actions affected groups. Here, individual defaulters experienced 
ostracism as the groups’ executive enhanced their symbolic power, by openly criticising individual 
members economic failures, as an embarrassment to the whole group. In other cases, the social 
unity of the group was utilised in attempts to renegotiate loan conditions with staff. Older women's’ 
symbolic power also stemmed from family members helping with instalments and enabled 
repayment statistics to look promising, but in an economic sense what occurred was a redistribution 
of existing family income.  
-Household disparities influencing repayment 
By concentrating on groups which have experienced repayment problems, it has been 
shown that individual members demand for credit is based on different household strategies. These 
reflect complexities that result in credit being used to balance out disparate household needs and 
aspirations. The ability of households to repay the loan, demands having the capacity to overcome 
these various constraints, and/or to be able to draw on social networks, in order that these can cover 
any economic problems that arise. Group members have subsequently considerably different levels 
of both social and economic capital, both prior to, and as a result of receiving a loan. It is further 
these heterogeneous traits that often result in groups not being in a position to operate in ways 
which the policy designs assume. Besides repayment problems stemming from borrowing 
communities not constituting a homogenous group, as the project assumes, economic difficulties 
also arise from the continued reproduction of group cohesion after problems are experienced. 
Defaulting members were often the individuals who were unable to overcome sufficiently the initial 
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restrictions which impeded their income growth, and further were unable to draw on ultra-group 
contacts to procure help for instalments.  
-Vulnerability and poverty factors 
As credit provision aspires to increase borrowers market participation, local 
communities success becomes conditioned by the vagaries of unstable markets, furthered by 
borrowing groups using credit to stockpile and hoard. On local levels this can quite easily cause 
supply blockages, and the accentuation of lean season vulnerabilities. Credit provision, which 
encourages increased numbers (often without past experience), to enter and take advantage of 
seasonal price differences, does not then automatically lesson the risks borrowers are exposed to 
and may even increase these. As was observed with defaulting individuals, their increased market 
participation, which credit allowed (influenced by the annual glut followed by decreasing stock and 
the need to pay interest on loans), often meant that they took risks they otherwise would not take, in 
order to make ends meet.  
Default also occurred as a result of borrowers taking the loan to offset previous 
seasons failures, then, after covering these, not being in an optimal position to make use of stock 
investments. Here, policy was more concerned with accruing as many new clients as possible, and 
assuming that group responsibility would be sufficient to cover any defaults. Investment in kind is 
also based on the presumption that prices will increase (which there is no guarantee for), and that 
these increases will coincide with the regular repayment demands, which is often not the case.  
-Effects on existing socio-economic organisation 
Going into detail now with how loans effect existing socio-economic organisation, it 
was found that prevalent modes of processing continue, though in more intense forms. This was 
because members had to accommodate the demands of group construction, attempt to synchronise 
the activities of up to 30 individuals competing in the same limited, credit based markets, and also 
satisfy the requirements of regular payment intervals, together with paying interest on the loan. As 
observed, the most significant economic division, was between the embedded exchanges of gift and 
contribution, where the interval between exchanges was paramount, and the demands of regular 
payment, which in the case of problem groups, their social relations could generally not 
accommodate. This meant that members increased market activity, facilitated by loan provision, 
was characterised by individual, goal orientated economic transactions, which led to members 
developing disparately. Here the initial household differences often became amplified, as different 
endogenous factors led to different levels of household success. Each members responsibility to 
oblige by loan conditions, despite often being based on family support, was subsequently separate 
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from the embedded traditions of community relations (economic) support, which in hardtimes could 
involve food distributions or, the much more common practices of investment in family ceremonies. 
Further, it could not be taken for granted that large investments in kind, just after harvest, would 
realise enough capital for the first instalments. This was because the high returns which repayment 
demanded, required stockpiling for a number of months, while optimal gains had often not been 
realised by the time the first instalments were due. This was reflected in the widespread opinion that 
the loan was a good thing, but was not enough to realise sufficient gains, to both keep enough stock 
for future price increases, to offset any extra household costs, to cover the costs of essential 
consumables, and as well provide enough cash for the instalments and pay the suppliers of their 
products.  
Consequently, the pursuit of wealth in kind, was of much more real value to the 
household, then the programme objective of enticing, encouraging and forwarding cash savings. 
Savings in kind was a strategy designed to capitalise upon expected near future price increases, 
which often did not correspond to repayment demands. There is strong evidence here from the cases 
discussed, that embedded practices of savings in kind, often the best option, considering market 
fluctuations, inflation and difficult access to cash savings, are undermined by the demands of 
regular payment and savings in cash. 
Disbursement at harvest times, designed to encourage investment in stock, while 
prices are at their lowest, presented different levels of risk to each individual in the group. Some 
were in the position to stock and process ample amounts, while others were not. Together with the 
constraints based on group unity, this increased the likelihood of repayment problems developing, 
due to some simply not possessing the ability to invest sufficiently to accrue gains and repay. On a 
community level, there was substantial anecdotal evidence, of household stockpiling causing 
periodic unavailability, because households were not prepared to sell at low prices, even if this did 
mean a temporary default on the loan. This caused tension with staff, who neglected the logic of 
borrowers not paying on time, and borrowers, who had to pretend that didn’t have any stock. 
Borrowers without any stock did attempt to renegotiate the loan conditions in terms of a social 
obligation to Simli Pong. But in broad terms, the main problem here was an incompatibility 
between embedded economic organisation, based on irregular and periodic income on the one side,  
and project demands for regular payment on the other to fulfil collection targets.  
By timing loan disbursements to coincide with harvests, borrowers rationed the 
delivery of their stock onto markets, which on a local level increased differences between those able 
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to stockpile and those not able to. This observation was supported by the fact that a delay in 
disbursement (due to late repayment on a previous loan), can directly effect the seasonal success of 
the group. In other words, maximum success from the loan required limiting supply onto markets 
during the lean season.  
In short, borrowers continue their traditional modes of investment and saving, while 
what is really demanded, in order to reduce poverty, is a balancing out of the fluctuations that result 
from these very seasonal vagaries, instead of encouraging communities to capitalise upon them.  
-Borrowers own empowerment understandings 
Concerning now borrowers own understanding of social and economic empowerment, 
this was mainly understood by them from their ability to take hold of the development of the 
household. In an economic perspective this was influenced by individual borrowers own 
dispositions, the initial reasons behind loan demand, and similarly the extent to which borrowers 
were in the position to increase income and control how any profit was spent. Here, their 
understandings of empowerment were much more than aspirations to increase income, and where 
this was not possible, increased influence, as discussed before concerning generation differences, 
was based on their ability to draw on and reproduce existing social relations. In positive times group 
reproduction contributed towards the maintenance of the loan group as a social  power, through 
which it drew its own authority, and members committed themselves to their public declaration of 
constituting common social objectives.  
In the case of the problematic groups however, the attempts to renegotiate loan 
conditions with staff, demonstrated how borrowers aspired to capitalise on the resources they 
possessed, and exchange these for the economic assets they required. This reflected how existing 
forms of investment in social capital endeavoured to solve cash shortages. Conversely, after 
economic problems were experienced, group reproduction and collective responsibility, could easily 
constrain the whole group in ways previously not experienced, as it could not be taken for granted 
that individuals social capital could be aggregated to solve the group’s economic problems. This 
was especially true concerning the group executives, who had the responsibilities of reproducing 
social unity through the calling and holding of meetings, making sure all payments were 
forthcoming, and not least acting as mediators between the group and project staff. Although these 
accrued social capital from these positions, as well as through their influence in group self-
selection, there was no indication that they had the inclination, capacity nor the opportunity to 
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capitalise economically on this new found form of symbolic capital. This then reflects the limits of 
project empowerment understandings.  
In sum the fulfilment of project aspirations was conditioned by the forces, both social, 
generational, household and structural, that hampered economic accumulation, which credit could 
not in these cases offset. This showed that members’ understanding of empowerment was based on 
mobilising the relations that their existing influence already rested on, and that loan group 
formation, was influenced by practices that may even not be interested in income increases. Social 
empowerment aspirations, again conditioned by difficult market access, transport and the age of 
members, evolved into conflictual situations, due to the differences between dynamic and rigid 
exchange mechanisms. Here it was the case, that those experiencing the biggest problems were 
individuals who were already socially isolated, and joined the group to bolster social networks and 
overcome previous seasons failures, often aware that they were taking a risk in committing 
themselves to a loan. Their inability to repay meanwhile could increase their social marginalisation, 
because it also revealed to other members that they were unable to procure economic help. Again 
here project design assumed that community unity could somehow compensate for this, but often 
meant that individuals and the group were not able to ultimately overcome constraining forces.  
-Theory and method perspectives 
Concerning Hyden’s concept of an economy of affection, in a sociological perspective 
it has been shown that this reflects the difficulties the community is up against in realising any 
economic objectives. It is not that the social organisational forms, such as family members joining 
the same group, material purchases used for community ceremonies and displays of coloured 
dresses etc, mitigate decidedly against capitalism, as Hyden writes. It is more to the point, that the 
investments in (female) social relations are a consequence of the market instabilities and 
experienced uncertainty in the processing activities. Here, social organisation went ahead of 
economic incentives, due to the limitations different loan group members experienced concerning 
inability to increase income. Regarding the consequences of group construction and the forms this 
takes by building on existing community strength, which are directly influenced by the demands of 
self sustainability, it has been recognised that the observations are in broad agreement with the 
arguments put forward by Adams et al, Mayoux, Rahman and Bothchway. These together 
emphasise that participatory based developmental projects do not consider the initial causes of 
hardship, and that policy designs assumes that individuals and group actions have the ability to 
overcome vulnerability. In this context these four theorists concentrate on different facets of the 
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same subject, and this thesis, in agreement with them, has recognised how embedded socio-cultural 
gendered relations become reproduced through programme implementation, and structures remain 
unchanged.   
In a methodological context time and space limitations also resulted in a number of 
significant other relations not being adequately covered, but which are also of central relevance for 
the understanding the effects of micro-credit. Amongst the most significant of these can be 
mentioned the extent to which larger loans would be able to decrease the number of households 
experiencing default, the extent to which investment in children's education actually results in these 
being able to find viable employment, and how, if and under what circumstances does the project 
training programme influence income increases. Concerning individuals immediately outside the 
loan groups themselves, more also need to be done concerning the consequences credit allocation 
has for women in these communities who are excluded from loan groups. And finally, concerning 
the development of the household as a whole, the consequences of excluding males from loan 
provision also has to be addressed.  
-Micro credit in a broader developmental perspective 
On a broader level the observations emphasise that credit allocation is ultimately 
unable to tackle the very structural characteristics, that cause the large demand for credit in 
communities, and vitally, that demand itself is a symptom of structural weaknesses which 
borrowers experience first hand. Micro credit allocation may actually accentuate structural 
vulnerabilities, as provision encourages an increased reliance on seasonal vagaries, the  
reproduction of economies based on processing primary produce, with little capacity to expand 
production, and economic success is conditioned by borrowers ability to take advantage of 
considerable market uncertainties. Also of significance here are extensive market and transport 
problems and customers demand for credit, which credit provision inadvertently makes borrowers 
more dependent upon. On the household level, credit reproduces traditionally embedded labour 
divisions between men and women, and the reliance on labour intensive, time consuming activities 
with low and uncertain profits. The success of household economies after credit provision, is then 
still bounded by the limitations of micro and macro practices, which both accentuate poverty and 
initiate women’s subordination. Of most concern here is women’s access to resources being 
conditioned by male dominated institutions, and the reproduction of labour intensive tasks based in 
and around the domestic realm. Overall the number of groups experiencing payment problems 
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(nearly 22% of the total), reflects the inability of individuals and groups to overcome these 
constraints.  
To conclude, credit provision alleviates the initial problem of access to funding in 
order to solve immediate difficulties, but repayment problems and default demonstrate that credit is 
unable to overcome the broader constraints that gave rise to initial demand and which cause 
household hardship.  
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Transcript of Group Loan Animation Report 
 
 
ANIMATION REPORTING FORMAT/BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
 
NAME OF GROUP:  xxxx 
 
DATE OF ANIMATION: 9th September 2004 
 
COMMUNITY: Tolon 
 
PRESENT:  30 
 
AGE OF GROUP: 20 years 
 
OBJECTIVES OF GROUP:  to help each other, to access loan, to help in our chn education 
 
ACHIEVEMENTS SINCE FORMATION:          more people are exposed to new things, health, facility 
 
SOURCES OF INCOME:   trading, farming, animal rearg- 
 
EXPENDITURE PATERN OF GROUP:  feeding households, chn. education 
 
PROPERTY OF GROUP/ASSETS:  bank – Ced´. 400,000 and 5 bags shea 
 
SOURCES OF CREDIT IN THE COMMUNITY: District assembly,  individuals 
 
TYPES OF TRAINING RECIVED BY GROUP:  Bullock farming   Loan management Skills & animal 
rearg. 
 
TYPES OF INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN 
WOMEN:  Rice, Groundnuts and Shea butter proc. 
 
SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL:  Buying, harvest  and picking of sheanuts 
 
MARKETING POINTS:  katin daa & wuribogu daa 
 
PROBLEMS MILITATING AGAINST EXPANSION OF INCOME GENERATING  
ACTIVITIES:  Low capital, Transport  availability of raw material marketing 
 
 
MARKETING AND PROCESSING TREND OF CHOSEN INCOME: 
GENERATING ACTIVITIES: unstable prices 
 
OFFICERS: Ready for Credit  
 
 
 
   XXX 
   NAME OF ANIMATOR 
 
Appendix 1, Application and animation report 
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